INTRODUCTION

In recent years, "globalization" has become a household word, spawning scholarly books, newspaper editorials, policy debates, and protests in the street. Practically everybody agrees that globalization is energizing the world economy while accelerating the flow of information to the far corners of the earth. But what are its consequences for international security affairs, including prospects for war and peace in the early 21st century? Equally important, what are its implications for U.S. national security policy and defense strategy, including U.S. military requirements and priorities? This study aims to help provide answers to these two critical questions.

The President's *National Security Strategy for a New Century (1999)* makes clear that globalization is a dynamic to be taken seriously because it is helping transform world affairs. The term can usefully be defined as the growing cross-border flows of trade, finances, technology, communications, ideas, and people that are drawing countries and regions closer together, creating a stronger web of interdependent ties that bring opportunity and vulnerability. Owing to globalization, events at the far corners of the world can now influence each other to a greater degree than in the past. For example, developments in Asia can have a big impact on Europe and Latin America, and vice versa. As such, globalization seems capable of acting as a two-edged sword. It can help countries cooperate in the pursuit of peace, prosperity, and multilateral community-building. But it can also intensify the dangers, risks, and threats of the modern era; for example, it can stimulate the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Above all, it is not purely an economic phenomenon. For good or ill, it will be interacting with other dynamics to influence how world politics unfold in the coming years. It will play an important role in determining whether the early 21st century is a time of growing harmony or, instead, mounting chaos and strife.

Building upon this perspective, Chapter I initiates the analysis by putting forth six “axial strategic principles” for gauging globalization’s impact on world politics and U.S. national security strategy. It argues that globalization is helping make the democratic community prosperous, peaceful, and united. But such big regions as the Middle East, Eurasia, Africa, South Asia, and parts of Asia are a different matter. There, a great deal of strategic chaos already exists owing to troubled politics, economics, and security affairs. Rather than dampen this chaos, globalization may magnify it in some respects. If this chaos intensifies, the coming era could be quite dangerous in ways that damage not only hope for global progress, but also the democratic community’s interests and safety. Deciding how to cope with this chaos will be a main challenge facing the United States and its partners.

Chapter II addresses how this strategic setting will affect U.S. defense strategy, military forces, and preparedness standards in the coming years. It argues that an era of change lies ahead. U.S. forces are themselves being transformed by new doctrine, but equally important, global affairs are mutating in ways that will produce new strategic purposes, missions, geographic involvements, threats, dangers, coalition practices, and requirements. U.S. military forces will need to respond accordingly. A strong U.S. military posture will still be required: indeed, perhaps somewhat bigger, better-funded, and better-equipped than now. But the future posture cannot be a mirror-image of today. It will need to adopt new approaches to overseas presence, power projection, peacetime strategic shaping, crisis-management, and war fighting. Most likely, today's preoccupation of being prepared to wage two regional wars will give way to a new approach focused on the wider set of missions being regularly performed and on the wartime situations likely to be

encountered. As discussed in Chapter II, a number of other practical changes may be necessary. All are aimed at making U.S. forces more flexible, adaptive, superbly prepared, and effective in carrying out their future missions in a globalizing world of promise and peril.

Regardless of how this study's specific judgments are appraised, its fundamental points are noteworthy. The United States will definitely need a coherent national security policy and defense strategy as globalization gains momentum. But unlike the Cold War, it will not be able to anchor its strategic approach on the narrow, mechanical task of dealing with a few permanent enemies and potential wars. Because threat-based planning is fading into history, the United States will need to think and act in broader terms. It will need to focus intently on its interests and goals in a setting of great fluidity. It will need to control multiple chaotic dangers so that the international system as a whole can be kept stable in ways that encourage progress. It will need to be both proactive and creative, while always being ready to respond adeptly to surprising changes and unexpected reversals of fortune. This strategic agenda, so unlike the past, will not be easily carried out. It will require a new mindset about policy, strategy, and the use of military power. Mastering it will be key to dealing with a new world that we are only beginning to understand.

Nobody knows where the future is headed, but it should not be taken for granted. The global changes at work today seem equally capable of bringing the world together or tearing it apart. For this reason, the future should not be entrusted to globalization, market dynamics, and natural political forces. If left to their own devices, they might produce descent rather than progress. Strong government policies, by the United States and many other countries, will be needed to help guide the future. They will need to work closely together to help shape the coming interplay between economics and security politics so that the 21st century--the truly global century--fulfills its bright promise, rather than reproduces the disasters of the 20th century. The challenge of shaping the future in a world of great complexity and bewildering change is a daunting one. But it is an important, and worthy, one.

I.

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AXIAL STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES FOR GAUGING GLOBALIZATION'S IMPACT ON SECURITY AFFAIRS

The dawn of a new century and millennium coincides with the arrival of a new era in world politics. The coming era likely will be one in which economics and security share center stage in determining how the world evolves. Rather than one dominating the other, the two will play equally powerful roles, and they will interact closely, exerting great influence over each other. In this setting, globalization is important partly because it is reshaping how the world economy operates and how people communicate with each other. But what makes it more significant is its potential impact -- direct and indirect--on international politics and security affairs. This chapter does not definitively answer questions about its impact, for they are clouded by too many uncertainties for clear answers. Instead, this chapter provides a simple framework for thinking about them in illuminating ways. Its goal is to help provide added tools for assessing globalization's impact in the strategic arena, where the great issues of war and peace will be decided. It assesses the implications for U.S. national security strategy, including the core endeavors and goals that are to drive its efforts in the coming years.

This chapter's thesis is simply stated. Globalization is helping create big opportunities, but also big dangers if worrisome trends are not handled wisely. *Whereas the great drama of the 20th century was democracy's struggle against totalitarianism, the defining issue of the early 21st century will be whether the democratic community can control dangerously chaotic strategic affairs in the vast, troubled regions outside its borders, which are not being made permanently peaceful by globalization.* Although the democratic community is making progress within its borders, it will face the challenge of fostering greater strategic stability at key places outside them not only to protect its own interests and values, but also to help progress take hold there. This challenge of suppressing new-era dangers while promoting healthy trends will especially fall on the United States. As superpower leader of the democratic community, it will need not only to blend its security and economic policies together, and to use its military power wisely, but also to mobilize help from its allies and partners. These tasks do not promise to be easy. Performing them effectively could play a major role in determining whether the future produces growing tranquility, or instead goes up in smoke. The bottom line is that while globalization and other unfolding dynamics have the potential to elevate much of the world onto a higher plain of peace and prosperity, they also have the capacity to tear it apart in ways that produce a dark future. The challenge is to ensure that the former unfolds, not the latter.

The Need for a Simple But Powerful Framework

The strategic questions raised by globalization are critical. How will globalization affect foreign policy, diplomacy, and defense strategy around the world? Will it produce spreading tranquility and community-building, or growing political conflict and strife, or some of both? What implications does it pose for U.S. policy and strategy abroad? Globalization necessitates that U.S. policy must see the world as a whole, think globally, and act globally--while not losing sight of each region's unique features. What goals and priorities should the United States embrace in responding to globalization's opportunities, challenges, and dangers? In strategic terms, how should the United States act in a globalizing world? What should be its core strategic concepts, its aims, and its visions?

These questions require discriminating answers because our understanding of globalization's effects is maturing. A few years ago, a popular view held that globalization would make nearly the entire world peaceful by influencing countries everywhere to seek democracy, market economies, and cooperative relations with each other. This hope still prevails in important ways, but since then, a more complex reality has become apparent. Recent trends suggest that globalization may have a powerful impact in some regions, but not all regions, especially where traditional state interests, geopolitics, and aggressive instincts still abound. Even in places where globalization will shape the future, its impact will not always be positive. In some places, it likely will be an engine of progress. But in other places, it may have damaging effects, thereby exacerbating already-serious problems. Globalization thus is likely to be uneven and hydra-headed. Its diverse strategic consequences need to be grasped if its weighty policy implications are to be understood.

Addressing these questions requires an intellectual framework for identifying the key factors at work. *In order for this framework to be potent, it must be simple*. Analysis will get nowhere if it portrays globalization in terms of 50 different activities affecting the world's 200 countries in separate ways. This approach will result in a picture of such hideous complexity that nobody, not even the authors, will be able to discern clear strategic messages. In virtually all disciplines, the best theories are those that reduce great complexity to a few simple ideas. Such theories lay a rock-solid foundation, upon which increasingly elaborate formulas can be built. This is the case in analyzing globalization, where a blizzard of events can be understood only if the basics are brought into focus.

Accordingly, this chapter puts forth a small set of six "axial strategic principles" for accomplishing the task. These principles deal with fundamentals and essential elements, from which everything else flows. They are propositions for organizing scholarly thought, not axioms for proclaiming irrefutable truths. They are not cast in concrete, but instead can evolve as knowledge of globalization matures. They aspire to simplicity because that is exactly where good analysis normally finds its strength: by bringing clear order to a picture of confusing complexity. Obviously the world is more diverse than portrayed here. But the purpose of theory-building is not to grasp every detail. Instead, theory works best when it offers a few ideas that have great explanatory power: covering not everything, but much of what is important.

The Phenomenon: Globalization in a Changing World

The first two strategic principles set the stage, first by distinguishing between structure and process in contemporary international affairs, and then by probing globalization's core features. By analyzing the dynamics of change and integration in some depth, they further highlight the extent to which the modern world of economics and security differs greatly from the Cold War, when change and integration seemed like foreign ideas.

Principle 1: In Analyzing World Affairs, Today's Structure Matters, but Change-Producing Processes That Will Shape the Future Are More Important.

If globalization's strategic impact is to be understood, analysis must address *both* the current structure *and* the process of change in contemporary world affairs. There is a big difference between the two. As used here, "structure" refers to the physical characteristics of today's international system: the main actors, their relationships to each other, and how they are interacting. By contrast, "process" refers to the key dynamics by which the international system is changing, in ways altering today's system and creating a different one tomorrow.[i]

During the Cold War, structure mattered most because the world was so frozen into rigid

bipolarity that little change was occurring. *In today's setting, structure is still important, but analyzing the process of change is more critical to understanding the future.* The reason is that today's setting is very fluid. Immense changes are at work, and many are neither linear nor evolutionary. They ensure that tomorrow's structure likely will be quite different from today's. Moreover, tomorrow's structure likely will not be frozen in concrete. The world is experiencing a period of great dynamism, spontaneous organization and reorganization, and perpetual novelty as it rapidly moves from one temporary structure to the next. The strategic situation is more akin to the first half of the 20th century, when the international system changed its core features four times in rapid succession, rather than to the last half of the century, when bipolarity formed early and hardly changed afterward.

This process of change may appear random, even chaotic. But at its fundamentals, it is being driven by forces that often have logic and purpose, and that are capable of combining together to produce orderly outcomes. As a result, things eventually may settle down and a new structure will congeal with enduring characteristics. But not for a while, and probably not for many years. In the interim, the United States and other countries will face the principal challenge of dealing with an ever-changing world, not a status-quo world or even a world of familiar features that last long enough to get to know them.

What lies ahead is to be seen, but it will be primarily determined by how nation-states act and interact. To a degree, the ability of national governments to control their destinies is being eroded by external constraints and internal pressures. Transnational actors now abound, and in some ways, the old Westphalian system is giving way to a post-Westphalian politics in which countries are no longer fully sovereign, much less supremely independent in everything they do. Within countries, moreover, pluralist politics is a growing norm, and sometimes interest groups in one country cooperate with interest groups in others. Yet, the nation-state will remain the most powerful actor on the world scene. Indeed, the number of countries has been increasing as old empires have collapsed. The growing importance of events abroad dictates that virtually all countries will have to pay more attention to foreign policy, including the three key components of politics, economic, and security. Because countries will be responding to their interests and their strategic situations, they will not behave in uniform ways. What unites them is that all will be dealing with a setting of major changes in the globalizing world.

Principle 2: Globalization Is a Process Producing a Worldwide System and Faster Change.

Globalization involves the growing cross-border flows of trade, finances, capital, technology, information, ideas, and people that are driving countries and regions into an expanding web of ties. It is best seen as being mostly a process of change, not an already-existing structure. Eventually a fully globalized world structure may emerge, but it has not yet arrived. *What matters is the big transformation being brought about by globalization's dynamics.* Globalization's twin features, its impact on domestic affairs and international affairs, merit discussion here.

The changes taking place in the domestic political and economic affairs of many countries, especially those within the democratic community, go back more than twenty years, long before globalization became a noticeable trend. One of these changes was democratization. Between 1978 and 1998, the number of democracies doubled: from only 43 countries to fully 88, with as many as 53 other countries partly free.*[ii]*. This trend was a result of political upheavals, demanding not only freedom but also better economic conditions, in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and parts of Asia. A second big change was a major switch from state-owned and command economies to market economies in various guises. Thatcher's Britain was a pace-setter in its pursuit of denationalization and privatization, but its example was followed by many countries in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, Latin America, South Asia, Asia and Africa. A third change was the switch from protectionist economic strategies to export strategies, which was led by Asian countries but now is being followed by many others. In powerful ways, these three changes worked together to greatly alter the world political and economic scene. Whereas authoritarian governments, command economies, and protectionism often seemed the wave of the future in earlier decades, now they were in sharp retreat: not everywhere but in many places. Replacing them in key regions, with varying degrees of fervor, came democratic governments, market economies, and a willingness to participate actively in the world economy.[iii]

These three changes helped set the stage for today's globalizing dynamics. By drawing many countries into closer contact with international markets, globalization is putting added pressure on them to modernize their governments, societies, economies, and businesses in order to compete better. Not all are responding vigorously, but those trying to adopt are experiencing considerable change in their domestic arrangements. The transition is easiest for already-modern countries, such as the United States, that possess democratic governments, capitalist economies, free-trade practices, skilled workforces, and information-era businesses capable of producing goods and services that sell profitably in international markets. It is more difficult for countries that are less well-endowed with these assets. It is quite hard, sometimes impossible, for the many ill-prepared countries that lack virtually all of these assets in essential ways. Around the world, as a result, some countries are responding effectively with alacrity, others are struggling but making progress, and still others are falling behind the power curve, or stagnating, or even regressing.

Efforts to forecast globalization's future impact on domestic affairs should remember that industrialization, modernization, technological growth, and communications have been at work for fully two centuries. Countries and cultures have responded in different ways: e.g., Europe became democratic and capitalist, but until recently Russia remained authoritarian in its politics and economics. The result has been today's world of great diversity. This deeply-entrenched diversity is not going to disappear overnight in response to globalization, which is the latest trend in a long line of trends. Yet globalization is a powerful force. It likely will not propel the world toward a single model of domestic affairs, but because it brings about changes, it will help produce the multiple ways in which the future's diversity is manifested. Democracies likely will respond in one way, authoritarian countries in another way, and traditional countries in yet a third way. When the dust settles, these three types of countries

may resemble each other in some features, but still be significantly different in other key features. What unites them is that all will be altered by globalization in significant ways.

Equally important is globalization's impact on how modern international relations are being carried out in politics, economics, and security affairs. Here too a future of continuity and change seemingly lies in store. To a major degree, national foreign policies are influenced by geostrategic facts of nature that will not change. U.S. foreign policy, for example, is powerfully shaped by the country's sheer size, location in the western hemisphere, and reliance on the Atlantic and Pacific oceans for access to foreign markets. Comparably important but different geographical features help determine how Germany and Russia interact, and how China and Japan interact. The same applies in many other places. These geostrategic factors will remain constant, and all countries will bring their own values, perceptions, and attitudes to policy making. Even so, globalization will be an influential factor, among many, bringing about important changes in how many countries view their premises and priorities in foreign policy. The consequence likely will be a world of continuing great diversity in foreign policies, but in one way or another, virtually all policies will be affected by globalization in two key ways:

First, as outlined earlier, globalization, acting as a relentless but uneven dynamic, is fostering "integration" in the sense of bonding separate places and activities together in ways that make them increasingly connected and interactive. The consequence can be enhanced peace, but not necessarily so, for a variety of outcomes are possible depending upon how these closer interactions play out. In the economic arena, for example, growing trade relations can draw countries closer together in political terms, even leading them to bury their hatchets over old conflicts. Conversely, however, history shows that economic changes can have the opposite effects, especially when they unfold unevenly. Some countries may take advantage of their growing wealth and power to bully vulnerable neighbors. Other countries doing less well in economic markets might employ their military strength to gain resources and wealth through coercion, or simply to lash out in frustration against more fortunate nations. In the geopolitical arena, globalization may prove to have similar hydra-headed effects. It may help lessen some existing rivalries, but leave others untouched, while fanning still others and giving rise to entirely new ones. The core transformation is that globalization is creating, for the first time in history, a true "international system" because actors and actions in one place are starting to affect importantly those in other places. In earlier eras, some regions were bonded internally to create a unified political and economic system: Europe before World War I is an example, one that ended unhappily. Worldwide, the globalization process has been underway since the mid-1800's, when the telegraph and modern naval vessels began drawing widely separated regions closer together. But never has the entire world been bonded together in the close ways emerging today. This trend is likely to intensify in the coming years.

A true system does not exist simply because key actors are located nearby each other. For a system to exist, they must interact like billiard balls powerfully bouncing off each other as they roll across a pool table. Seen in formal terms, a fully developed system exists when a change in one component part, located somewhere on the system's outer periphery, causes a significant change in another part positioned on the opposite periphery. Chaos and complexity theorists call this the "butterfly effect": e.g., a political coup in Paraguay can cause worried policy tremors in Peking. [iv]Simply stated, globalization's process of outward-spreading developments in multiple areas is making the world's actors greatly more interconnected and interdependent.

As a consequence, separate regions are starting to affect each other more than in the past. The actions of a growing number of countries, not just big superpowers, are starting to influence the policy calculations of other countries located far away. Also, separate functions and subsystems are now affecting each other more powerfully. Not only is a true "world economy" evolving, but its dynamics are influencing security affairs in important ways. Conversely, globalizing security dynamics are starting to influence world economic trends in increasingly potent ways. The same is true in other

functional areas. For example, global warning, struggles over natural resources, WMD proliferation, and international organized crime are separate activities that are staring to influence each other significantly.

A good example of regions influencing each other is the recent Asian economic flu. It began in Southeast Asia, but quickly spread like a contagious disease around the world, damaging economies as far away as Russia and Latin America. Security affairs are still heavily regional and have not yet shown such contagious properties, but signs of growing cross-regional interactions are emerging. One reason is that the United States and other big powers are acting in multiple regions on behalf of global strategies. For example, China's diplomatic intervention in the Kosovo conflict shows how the influence of a powerful country now can be projected far beyond its immediate region. Many analysts feel that if WMD proliferation begins accelerating, it will have contagious properties, engulfing several regions. Even short of this, globalization means that future regional security affairs will not take place in isolation, but in growing ways, will be influenced by the larger international setting.

The growing connection between economics and security affairs is already becoming manifest. For example, North Korea has been selling weapons abroad in order to earn hard currency, and its flirtation with long-range missiles may be intended to extract economic blackmail from the United States and other countries. Iraq continues menacing Kuwait and Saudi Arabia not only for political reasons, but also to gain control of Gulf oil and its profitable sale. A few years ago, China tried to intimidate Taiwan with missile tests apparently intended to deflate Taiwan's stock market and influence its elections. Elsewhere, key actors with more constructive goals in mind are showing awareness of the connection between security and economics. In Europe, the western democracies are trying to bring East European countries into their fold by extending membership to them in both NATO, their premier security body, and the EU, their premier economic body. Almost everywhere, countries face the task of harmonizing their foreign economic policies with their national security strategies. China and Russia both face this challenge, as do the Europeans and the Japanese. So does the United States.

These trends likely are a forerunner of bigger things to come. In today's world, a full-blown international system does not yet exist. But owing to globalization's tendency to accentuate interconnections, such a system is coming. In tomorrow's world, separate regions and functional subsystems will still exist. But they will no longer operate in a cocoon, driven solely by their internal structures and processes. Instead, they also will be influenced importantly by the larger international system as a whole.

Second, globalization also is accelerating the rate at which changes occur on the world stage. Earlier, changes to the world structure tended to move slowly. No more. Owing to the information age, the emergence of new technologies, and other globalization dynamics, change is now taking place more rapidly, and its pace likely will continue accelerating in the coming years. Moreover, globalization by no means is the only change underway. In many places, countries are redefining their identities, goals, governments, and societies for reasons that go beyond globalization. As a result, the world is headed toward a future in which developments that once took decades to unfold will now take only a few years--or less. In this setting, swift and surprising reversals of direction will come with growing frequency. A good trend can quickly be replaced by a bad trend, and then reverse itself just as promptly. Something valued by the United States can suddenly disappear, and be replaced by something dreadful, or the reverse. Also important, events will have contagious effects and cascade upon one another, creating rock slides and avalanches for good, or ill, or a combination of both. What exists today may not exist tomorrow: not only at sunset, but also at sunrise.

This process of fast change--in which globalization is not only creating a true international system but also doing so rapidly in continuously fluctuating ways--has big strategic consequences and

major implications for how the United States sees the world. As globalization gains greater momentum, it will steadily acquire a growing capacity to alter the fundamentals of the world's structure, and to do so far more rapidly than anything experienced in the past. This does not mean that globalization will rule the world or make it a homogenous place. Its limits need to be recognized, for other powerful factors also will be shaping the future. Yet globalization will exert a substantial influence, bringing about changes of its own, some of which will help make the world more heterogeneous, not homogeneous.

As a result, the United States will need to think in properly responsive strategic terms. Rather than trying to manage an already-existing and enduring world structure, it will need to focus primarily on channeling an ongoing process of change and bonding. It will need to grapple with an ever-emerging future whose destination is not only uncertain, but also capable of moving in multiple different directions depending upon how key countries act and events play out. In this key sense, the future will always be "up for grabs", with the capacity to produce good or ill. The never-ending task will be one of continuously trying to grab the future, to shape it, and sometimes, to hold on for dear life.

The Strategic Consequences of Globalization

Amidst this setting, the strategic consequences can best be analyzed by first portraying the current international structure and then examining how globalization may alter it in the coming years. Two axial principles perform this task:

Principle 3: Today, Globalization is Washing Over an International Structure That Is Mostly Bimodal, Composed of the Democratic Community and the Outlying World.

In its fundamentals, the current international structure is bimodal because it is composed of two separate, very different parts. This structure is not highly polarized: It is not organized into two competing camps in confrontation with each other. But in their politics and economics, these two parts of the world are about as different as different can be. This is the case not only in their physical characteristics, but also in their current peacefulness and capacity for progress.

The bimodal nature of today's international structure can be seen by examining ten key attributes of peace and progress in the various regions, listed below. For the most part, the democratic community scores quite high on all of these attributes. This especially is the case in North America, Europe, and democratic Asia. Latin America and some other democratic zones score lower, but this largely owes to their economic and social conditions, not to authoritarian governments or stressful security affairs. By contrast, many regions of the outlying world score low when all ten attributes are taken into account. To be sure, there are pockets of peace and progress. But overall, these regions typically lack democratic governments, their economic and social conditions are often troubled, their countries do not cooperate heavily in multilateral institutions, and their multipolar security affairs are often conflict-laden. Together, these conditions add up to a setting of potential strategic chaos: far different from what prevails across the democratic community.

Key Attributes of Peace and Progress

1. Democratic governments and rule of law.
2. Market economics.
3. Stable, modern societies.
4. Wealthy economies.
5. Constructive involvement in world economy and information era.
6. Benign foreign policies and stable, non-conflictual security affairs.

7. Benign economic policies that help promote political collaboration, not conflict.
8.Major participation in multilateral institutions.
9.Unthreatening defense policies and military preparedness.
10. Support for democratization and community-building.

The democratic community includes those countries that not only have democratic governments but also participate in democracy's multilateral institutions in politics, economics, and security. For most of the 20th century, the democracies were besieged by deeply endangering totalitarian threats. Since the end of the Cold War and the Soviet-led bloc a decade ago, this troubled situation has been transformed into something far better. The democracies now find themselves not only free and prosperous, but also possessing far greater strategic power, unity, and wider appeal than any rival. Moreover, their numbers have increased greatly, for their ability to combine liberal political values with successful economic performance through capitalist markets has proven attractive worldwide. The democracies, especially those with modern economies and high-technology industries prepared for the information age, are the countries best able to adapt successfully to globalization's pressures. [v]

With a recently enlarged membership of about 80-100 countries (depending upon how "democracy" and "membership" are defined), this community now includes about one-half of the world's nations, more than 70% of its wealth, and nearly one-third of its population (45% if India is counted). Its members vary greatly in their size, strength, cultures, and unique features. But what gives this community homogeneity is its agreement on common values. Inside their borders, its members regard political democracy and free-market economics as ideals, and in varying degrees, most of them practice these values. Outside their borders, they pursue their legitimate interests, but they respect their neighbors and international law, and most readily participate in international organizations. Few show any sign of lingering ultra-nationalism or imperialism. This especially is the case among the older, well-established democracies that lead this community, who now are mostly secure from invasion and have the luxury of shaping their foreign policies with community-building, economic gain, and related priorities in mind.

What marks the democratic community is the high degree of peace and tranquility within its boundaries. Its members often squabble over various issues: economic fissures were worrisome a decade ago and may be on the rise again. But on whole, this large community contains few sharp inter-state frictions and stressful geopolitical maneuvers in sharply polarized ways. Any lingering fear of war among them is fading into history. *Not only are they at peace with each other, but they tend to cooperate in diplomacy and security even as they compete in the economic market place.* Their economic competition, moreover, tends to be mutually profitable. For most, Ricardo's model of comparative advantage is at work, and the rising tide is lifting all boats.[vi] Globalization compels them to adjust their economies and sometimes to make painful changes, but provided they remain competitive, their long-range economic prospects are good. As a result, they tend to regard the increasingly integrated world economy as a good thing, and they mostly favor the idea of western-leaning democracy enlarging further, thereby expanding their already-large zone of peace and prosperity.

To be sure, this democratic community is not internally uniform or fully pristine. It has an "inner core" of about thirty powerful members, including the United States, Canada, the European Union, Japan, and a few other Asian democracies. These countries mostly have stable governments, liberal societies, and wealthy economies with an annual per-capita GDP of $20,000-30,000: well above the worldwide average of only $7,000. They are also united in collective security and defense alliances that cover most of them, and in their foreign policies, they cooperate closely in a variety of bilateral and multilateral forums, such as the G-8 and NATO. The community's "outer core" includes about 50

countries that are located in Latin America, plus parts of Asia, Africa, and other regions. These countries qualify as democracies in the sense of having elected governments, but for many, their commitment to liberal values and free-market economies tends to be less strong than the inner core. They are not nearly as wealthy as the inner core, nor do they cooperate closely in their diplomacy and security affairs. Lying beyond this outer core are about 35 countries struggling to adopt democracy and market economies, but making uncertain progress, facing tough struggles, and not cooperating in big ways.

Eastern Europe stands out as a region that has done a great deal to enlarge democracy's ranks. Little more than a decade ago, all of its countries had communist governments. Now nearly all of them are democracies that are adopting market economies and beginning to join NATO and the EU. Several Asian countries have also newly joined the ranks, including South Korea and Taiwan. Latin America has added even more countries to the total. Over the past two decades, most of its 25 countries have abandoned traditional rule and corporatist economies to adopt democracy and capitalism. Many are now cooperating in various multilateral institutions, such as NAFTA and Mercosur. Latin America continues to face formidable problems. Most of the region is still poor, and several countries are inflicted with serious social tensions and shaky politics. Drug trafficking and organized crime in Columbia and some other countries add to the region's troubles. Yet Latin America, as well as Eastern Europe and parts of Asia, are steadily making progress, and seem pointed toward becoming even fuller members of the democratic community in the coming years. Not coincidentally, many of these countries are benefitting from globalization more than being harmed by it.

Despite its internal diversity and blurring around the edges, this large democratic community is, beyond question, a readily identifiable strategic cluster on the world scene. In many ways, it is a well-developed "subsystem" in itself, with a widely perceived "sense of the whole" that marks it as distinctly separate from the rest of the world. Simply stated, its members have a great deal in common. They mostly view each other as friends and partners, and they behave accordingly. While this is especially true within the inner core, many countries in the outer core are trying to draw closer to the center, thereby further tightening the community's bonds and sharpening its already well-defined identity.

Democratic Community [vii]

	Population (Millions)	Total GDP 2000 ($, Trillions)	GDP per Head ($, 2000)
North America	311	$9.3 T.	$30,000
Europe	480	$9.8 T.	$20,420
Asian Democracies	217	$5.0 T.	$23,040
Latin America	492	$3.0 T.	$ 6,100
Other	150	$ .8 T	$ 5,300

* Excludes India, which is a democracy but is counted in the outlying world because of its independent foreign policy and strategic circumstances.

Beyond the borders of the democratic community, there lies the second part of the bimodal structure: the "outlying world" which is composed of multiple diverse regions. This large cluster also totals about one-half of the world's countries, albeit a few have one foot, or at least a few toes, in the democratic community. It is primarily located in the huge geographic expanse of Eurasia, Asia, the Greater Middle East, and Africa. It is decidedly heterogeneous: not only in its physical structure but also

its values. Indeed, its lack of a common identity makes it highly amorphous and fragmented, lacking any sense of the whole. Not by coincidence, this outlying cluster contains many of the countries that are most ill-prepared to adapt to globalization, or at least face the biggest transformations, because they lack the necessary foundations in government, society, and economics.

Outlying World

	Population (Millions)	*otal GDP 2000 ($, Trillions)*	*GDP per Head ($, 2000)*
Russia and Eurasia	282	$1.5 T.	$5,400
China and Asia	1,750	$5.0 T.	$2,800
South Asia	1,316	$1.7 T.	$1,300
Greater Middle East	315	$1.8 T.	$5,700
Sub-Saharan Africa	560	$ .6 T.	$1,100

This strategic cluster includes such big powers as Russia, China, and India; a number of medium-sized but locally potent countries; and many small countries. Its members embrace a wide spectrum of political and economic ideologies that find expression in greatly different internal policies. Democracy and market economics are sprouting up in key places, but in large part, this cluster is ruled by authoritarian or traditional regimes, and its national economies are often state-owned or otherwise corporatist. This cluster's societies, moreover, tend to be traditionalist, embracing values and structures not well-suited for energetic participation in capitalism and the modern world economy.

The foreign policies of these numerous countries cover a wide spectrum. Perhaps the dominant stance is that most countries pursue their "national interests", defined in state-centric terms, rather than collectivist values or universalist visions. The majority of these countries are responsible in their intentions and peaceful in their conduct. But not all act this way, and the presence of a few troublemakers can cause significant tensions in regions that lack the capacity for collective action. Even a setting of countries pursuing ostensibly legitimate interests can create difficulty when these interests are not fully compatible. In any event, the plethora of different foreign policy models, carried out by multiple countries of varying size, helps account for the various regions of the outlying world being so heterogeneous in their make-ups, and so significantly different from each other to boot. Eurasia, the Balkans, the Greater Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and non-democratic Asia: all of these regions have unique strategic contours that make them quite different from each other. What unites them is that all lack the democratic community's sense of unity and readily achievable progress in a globalizing world. Indeed, all are struggling to cope with the unique and multifaceted problems facing them.

In these multiple regions, several countries are trying to adopt democracy and market economies, and to join the democratic community. Some actively cooperate with the United States and its close allies in security and economic affairs. Others admire or accept the democratic community, but choose to live quietly outside it, pursuing their independent values and interests in undisturbing ways. Still others are mostly intent on preserving their traditional cultures and politics, and thereby are preoccupied with warding off the intrusive effects of the democratic community and globalization, not actively opposing them on the world stage.

Others, however, have different attitudes. *Russia, China, and India are big powers that can best be portrayed as "strategic challengers"*. They bring dissimilar domestic arrangements to the strategic

table, but they are similar in the sense of using their large size to pursue traditional geostrategic interests in their foreign policies. All three seem eager to participate in the world economy in order to profit from it. But they are less enthused about accepting the security structure created by the United States and its democratic allies. Independently minded, they aspire to be influential strategic powers in their own right: at least in their own regions and perhaps beyond. Their strategic stance seems to be one of becoming wealthy on the world economy in order to gain the strength needed to put a big imprint on the security structure, in ways that elbow aside the United States and its close allies in order to advance their interests and conceptions. If they get their way, Russia will play a big role in Eurasia and Europe, China will dominate Asia, and India will hold sway in South Asia. The resulting global security system will differ considerably from today, and the world economy may change along with it.

Big powers have the capacity to contemplate such designs. As for lesser powers, some are angry and frustrated with the democratic community and their own lots, but do not pursue aggressive foreign policies aimed at altering the status quo. Still others, however, are so angry, frustrated, and ambitious that they are aggressively willing to challenge the status quo, and to victimize their neighbors while menacing western interests. The result can be nationalism as witnessed in Serbia, or classical raw-boned geopolitical behavior, as seen elsewhere. A few fall into the category of being genuine outlaw states and potential aggressors: North Korea and Iraq are examples. Elsewhere, several countries are troubled or failing states in the sense that their governments are losing internal control and their societies are plunging into ethnic clashes, tribalism, and violence. Finally, a few are becoming a new breed of predator: criminal states that seek economic profit through terrorism, drugs, weapons profiteering, and other contraband.

Despite the heterogeneity of these diverse regions in the outlying world, core similarities unite many of them. They are not part of the democratic community, and owing to their preferences or conditions, most are unlikely to join it anytime soon. They are not wealthy: per capital GDP's hover at about $1,000-5,000 annually. While their economic fortunes vary, most of them are not prospering on the world economy in ways that point to great wealth in the future. For example, Russia has been victimized by a collapsing economy and a staggering loss of wealth in recent years. While it has privatized much of its economy, only lately has it started to rebound. China has been strongly on the upswing, and some of its regions are modernizing rapidly, but overall it remains a poor country with a per capita GDP of about $4000. With only a some exceptions, the countries of the Greater Middle East and South Asia are poorer still, and Africa is mostly poverty-stricken. Apart from some pockets of progress, these countries mostly do not have information-era economies. Many are still positioned in the industrial age or, in multiple cases, the agrarian age. To compound matters, many are saddled with dysfunctional governments and political systems, growing populations that cannot be housed, teeming masses living in decaying cities, weak medical systems, and poorly educated work forces. Such conditions leave many of these countries struggling to survive, not eagerly awaiting the beneficial effects of a globalizing world.

This characterization of widespread troubles is not meant to imply that domestic conditions across the entire outlying world are uniformly glum and future prospects are bleak everywhere. Although traditional or authoritarian regimes hold power in most countries, their behavior varies: some are cruel and exploitative of their societies, but others are more caring and enjoy popular support. Economic conditions also vary in ways resulting in a hierarchy within each region. In Asia, Malaysia's annual GDP per person of $11,000 is well-above Indonesia's $4,500. In the Greater Middle East, Saudi Arabia's per capita GDP of $10,000 is far higher than Jordan's $4,700. Even in relatively poor countries, there is often a wealthy upper class. This small elite presides over a large lower class whose income is very low. The missing element is a vibrant middle class. In these countries, the attitude of the lower classes varies: some are deeply frustrated by their poverty, but others seemingly are content because their values are not highly materialist. Thailand's countryside, for example, is poor but tranquil because

many Thais are content with their life-styles. Moreover, a number of countries are witnessing at least parts of their economies being energized by globalization in ways producing greater wealth at least for some people. To a degree, truth in this arena is relative: it lies in the eyes of the beholder. Sometimes poor people are happy, as are people who lack liberty. Nonetheless, the basic point remains valid: most countries of the outlying world lack the health, wealth, freedoms, and safety enjoyed by the industrial democracies -- by a wide margin.

Across the outlying world, these struggles in domestic affairs recently have been accompanied by a worrisome surge of chaos, conflict, and violence in inter-state affairs: not everywhere, but at sensitive spots in all key regions. In Europe, the Balkans have plunged into ethnic warfare in Bosnia and Kosovo in ways necessitating NATO's intervention. In Eurasia, Russia, itself struggling in its politics and economics, has brutally invaded breakaway Chechnya, but with uncertain success. In the Persian Gulf, U.S. airplanes regularly bomb Iraq in enforcing no-fly zones even as Iraq and Iran both pursue WMD systems. In South Asia, India and Pakistan have detonated nuclear weapons and are building missiles even as they continue struggling over Kashmir. In Asia, China is threatening to invade democratic Taiwan if it proclaims independence. North Korea seems equally capable of collapsing of its own weight or suddenly launching a powerful military attack on South Korea. In Southeast Asia, Indonesia recently experienced an internal upheaval, and the accompanying violence in East Timor was bad enough to necessitate intervention by international peacekeepers. In Africa, so many wars are being waged that the casual observer is hard-pressed to keep track of them. To be sure, these negative trends have been accompanied by positive signs: e.g., the Israeli-Arab peace process and Iran's steps toward moderation. But the bottom line is clear. The idea that the outlying world is marked by strategic chaos is not a prediction of the future. Ample chaos, of a violent sort, already exists there. The only issue is whether it will abate or grow as globalization gains steam and other changes take place.

While the future is uncertain, a key strategic reality is that nearly all countries in the outlying world are mostly left on their own in the international arena. Apart from a few alliances and partnerships of convenience, they mostly do not cooperate together. Nor do they enjoy the benefits of powerful collective security mechanisms that underscore their safety. In the arena of security and defense affairs, they live in a setting of structural fragmentation and anarchy. They do not have the luxury of focusing their foreign policies on economic gain because they cannot take their physical safety for granted. Some are deeply endangered by their neighbors, and even those living in peace face the potential prospect that this situation could change overnight. Still others are deeply endangered by the political frictions, ethnic clashes, and tribal impulses that divide their own societies. In varying ways, and to greater or lesser degrees, all of these countries are being buffeted by the adverse chaotic trends that, along with positive trends, are now sweeping over the outlying world.

What are the strategic consequences of this bimodal structure? They are twofold and profound. Essentially, life for the democratic community is basically good: very good for the inner core, and reasonably good or at least hopeful for the outer core. Most of its members have the luxury of being able to focus on happiness and wealth. Their basic needs are being met. Their governments, economies, and societies are functioning effectively. With the Cold War gone and their strategic power no longer matched by menacing adversaries, they do not have to worry about their safety and survival being taken away by dangerous power politics outside their borders.

For much of the outlying world, by contrast, life is considerably less good and sometimes, lousy. While conditions vary, many countries there are not being elevated by either their internal health,

or by the globalizing world economy, or by a surrounding community of cooperating neighbors. In many places, the exact opposite applies, for many countries are struggling internally even as they face serious dangers externally, and globalization is pressuring them to make changes beyond their ken. Whereas the democratic community makes Locke look like a prophet, the outlying world too-often confirms Hobbes' worst instincts of life being nasty, brutish, and short. This basic difference between the good life for one-half of the world and a troubled life for much of the other half is what gives today's international system its distinctly bimodal structure, in ways that have immense practical consequences for people everywhere.

Principle 4: Future Directions Point Toward Further Progress for the Democratic Community and Some Other Places, but Chaos and Turbulence for Key Parts of the Outlying World.

Where is this bimodal structure headed in the coming years? How will globalization affect it? Over the very long term (i.e., 50-100 years), it is possible, but far from certain, that democracy, markets, and cooperative communities will spread across the entire globe. The coming 5-20 years, however, are a different matter. During this shorter time, as matters now stand, these two components seemingly are headed toward very different fates. For the democratic community, life in a globalizing world seems destined to become ever-better: wealthier, more democratic, more peaceful, and more cooperative. For the outlying world, the future is uneven and not nearly so rosy. While globalization is part of the solution there, it is only a partial solution of indeterminate power, and in some respects, it is also part of the problem. For democracies and others situated to benefit from the positive effects while warding off the negative effects, globalization offers major opportunities to make further progress. But for many countries in the outlying world that are less favorably endowed to separate the good from the bad, globalization's hydra-headed effects offer them opportunities, but also spell trouble for them by adding new problems atop still-existing old problems .

The democratic community not only is headed toward ever-growing prosperity and cooperation, but also seems heavily on autopilot in key areas. That is, its progress has become so deeply embedded in underlying dynamics that it is sustainable almost on its own. True, governments must act to handle fissures, and to ensure that temporary roadblocks and potholes on the road to progress are overcome. But they no longer have to labor at creating the road itself, for it largely has been built, and much of it is already paved. A good example is European unity. To be sure, the EU faces many policy dilemmas and challenges in its efforts to broaden and deepen. But the underlying impulse to create a unified and peaceful Europe is now so deeply entrenched and widely shared that the EU's task is limited to creating an institutional architecture, not forging a basic political consensus on the wisdom of the fundamental enterprise.

The same judgment applies to the idea of sustaining the transatlantic and transpacific communities that bond the United States to its major European and Asian partners. In the coming years, many policy challenges will have to be faced in continuing to nourish and further develop these two communities as Europe unites and Asia's strength grows. But underlying foundations already have been laid in common values, cooperative security, and mutually profitable economics. Provided future challenges are handled wisely, few sensible observers worry any longer that these communities will somehow fracture or drift apart in a fundamental way. The Americans, Europeans and democratic Asians still quarrel a lot about specifics, but these quarrels arise within a stable family. Barring some colossal strategic infidelity by one or more members, divorce is not in the cards.

Ten years ago, many observers feared for the future of the democratic core. Two concerns motivated them. One concern was that the Cold War's end would remove the need to keep their alliances intact, and they consequently would drift slowly apart in security affairs. The other concern was that in this era of eroding security bonds, their mounting economic competition would drive them

sharply apart, perhaps to the point of viewing each other as adversaries, not partners. [viii] These concerns are still a preoccupation in some quarters. Yet the events of the past decade lead this study to judge that today's reality is more hopeful. Instead of dismantling their alliances, the democratic partners have been preserving and refurbishing them for new missions in a still-dangerous world. With the world economy propelling all of them toward greater prosperity, the democratic partners have been using diplomacy to seek common approaches, and have been more preoccupied with making their internal economies competitive rather than one-upping each other. None of this necessarily means that cooperation and progress necessarily will be the case in the future. Things could still fall apart if they do not cooperate adequately on new security missions, or if they allow normal economic competition to become strategic rivalry, or especially if both adverse trends unfold. But the key point is that these countries already posses the well-oiled practices and common strategic perspectives not only to prevent disaster, but to build upon their successful legacy, which already has transformed much of international affairs to the good.

Within the democratic community, a key issue will be the extent to which the large outer core of about 55 countries will join the inner core of 30 countries. Heavily affected here are Latin America, Europe's peripheral countries, and parts of Asia and Africa. Progress likely will be made in this arena, and in addition, some countries that are only partly democratic and capitalist today likely will advance further in their transition. Southeast Asia is a region where economic gains and greater democratization may both occur, provided countries there can restart their sputtering economies. Nonetheless, an emerging reality is that the democratic community seems unlikely to grow further in big ways in the coming years. *The rapid enlargement of the democratic community in recent years has been breath-taking, but it now seems to be slowing and approaching its limits.*

Democracy already has been adopted in most places likely to adopt it anytime soon. Many parts of the outlying world are proving to be much harder nuts to crack. The core reason is that the underlying conditions for creating democracy and market capitalism are not present in the necessary strength. Countries there typically lack the internal conditions for democracy to take hold: moderate pluralist politics, effective governments, cohesive societies with a strong middle class, and a hopeful economic future. They also lack the necessary external conditions, for democracy is hard-pressed to take hold when a country is deeply menaced by dangerous neighbors. This sobering reality has immense strategic consequences. *It means that democracy and capitalism cannot be relied upon to continue sweeping over the entire world, expanding on autopilot to bring stability and progress to the huge zones that continue to lack them.* Much of the outlying world will continue to face its current troubles, without democracy and capitalism to cure them.

This chaotic prospect does not necessarily mean that a catastrophe is looming everywhere in the outlying world, but it does mean that steady progress everywhere is not necessarily in the offing either. In important ways, a future of struggle, change, and turbulence apparantly lies ahead. *Already today, an intensifying struggle is underway between two competing dynamics: progress leading to peaceful cooperation vs. backsliding leading to fragmentation and conflict.* The outcome is uncertain and likely will vary from one region to the next. Depending on the specific place, things could get better, or just as easily get worse, or at least mutate in ways that leave a welter of different but still-imposing problems. The result will not only determine the fate of the outlying world, but also will profoundly affect the safety and contentment of the democratic community as well.

Globalization enters the picture here. As said earlier, it likely will operate in most places as a dynamic that has an important, but not wholly transforming, impact. Its positive features will affect how many countries determine their future internal political and economic institutions. It also will influence how many countries pursue their relations with each other, and often to the good. But its overall impact likely will be moderate because it will be operating in a setting where the terrain often is not fertile to

major progress, and where other powerful dynamics, some of them not for the good, will also be at work. Globalization itself, moreover, seems likely to have hydra-headed effects, spawning a mixture of good and bad results. This reinforces the conclusion that it should be seen as a variable, not a constant, and that along with other factors, it will help propel the future in uneven ways and in multiple different directions.

The good effects of globalization are well-known. Globalization likely will combine with other dynamics to produce economic growth across major parts of the outlying world in the coming years. Growth rates of 2-4% annually will not make countries rich overnight, but will help improve conditions there. Opportunities for economic progress and access to information will help encourage adoption of democratic values. The bad effects are less well-known, but are real. For example, some countries doubtless will benefit in big ways from participating in the world economy's growing trade and financial patterns. But many others will benefit only modestly, some will remain largely unaffected, and a number seem likely to be damaged--in ways leaving them still-poor, frustrated, and angry. What globalization likely will produce is not a homogeneous zone of prospering happy capitalists, but instead a diverse pattern of winners, losers, and canoe paddlers: i.e., countries struggling to stay afloat.[ix]

Likewise, modern communications increases public awareness in more ways than one. One effect can be to spread enthusiasm for democracy and other liberal political values. But another effect can be to fan anti-western backlashes, nationalism, religious extremism, cultural antagonism, ethnicity, terrorism, and crime. Globalization can also erode the sovereignty of governments, and weaken their ability to control their societies. To a degree, the recent revolutionary upheavals in East Timor, Chechnya, Africa, and the Balkans may owe to the ability of modern communications to mobilize resentful social groups into action. Typically non-democratic governments presiding over societies with deep social cleavages find their stability threatened, not enhanced, by globalization. The collapse of such governments, and even entire states, can unleash pent-up violence as ethnic groups and tribes are given license to attack each other.

Above all, the limits of globalization should be recognized. Globalization is washing over regions whose politics, economics, and security affairs are influenced by many other factors, some of them immensely powerful and capable of diluting globalization's positive impact. The notion that market economics and the information era will create a common political culture across the outlying world--complete with pro-western attitudes--seems more facile by the day. The diverse political cultures in the outlying world are far too deeply entrenched for any such wholesale transformation, irrespective of how many multinational businesses, Hollywood movies, and McDonald's hamburger stands appear on the scene. The Russians will remain mostly as they are today and history has made them: Slavic in their thinking. So will the Chinese, the Asians, the Middle East Muslims, the Indians, the Pakistanis, and the sub-Saharan Africans. All of these cultures will continue to see modern life through the lenses of their own experiences and values, and they will behave accordingly.

Amidst this diverse cultural and economic setting, traditional geopolitics is not going to give way entirely to a new era of growing multilateral cooperation. Progress in some areas may be gained. But today's tensions likely will continue to exist in many places, and even to intensify in others. *The key reality is not solely that many countries in the outlying world dislike and distrust the democratic community. The more important reality is that they often dislike and distrust each other, including their immediate neighbors.* As a result, many of today's long-standing hotspots may continue to exist, and others may appear. Notwithstanding globalization, the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa are not likely to become zones of peace anytime soon.

Behind the scenes, a new era of geopolitics among the big powers may be emerging, in ways partly spawned by globalization's diverse effects. Of special importance is that Russia is losing power

while China is gaining it. Long a respected power, Russia seems likely to continue resenting its loss of status, and to be left increasingly desperate to control deteriorating events around its borders and its immediate Eurasian region. China will be feeling its oats as its power grows, and increasingly will be prone to assert its strength and interests in Asia and elsewhere.

Meanwhile, India, whose own power is growing, seems likely to assert itself in South Asia. All three of these countries will be pursuing traditional state interests, and none seems likely to have the United States in its gunsights. While they likely will not become close partners of the United States, neither will they be implacable enemies of it. But they may menace other countries around their borders that are closely tied to the United States, often in deeply binding security treaties. What the United States should fear is not direct rivalry with these big powers, but instead growing trouble in Russia's relations with Germany and the EU, Russia's relations with China, China's relations with Japan and other Asian countries, and India's relations with China and Pakistan. If not managed carefully, these four key relationships have the potential to deteriorate into big-time geopolitical rivalries, in ways drawing in the United States because of its own interests and security ties with close friends and allies.

Looking at this complex geostrategic setting and knowing history, some experts forecast big trouble ahead. Samuel Huntington foresees a cultural clash pitting the West against the rest. Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski are worried about a world of restored geopolitical tensions. Hans Binnendijk frets about a new bipolar rivalry, pitting the U.S.-led western alliance system against a new, interest-based bloc that unites Russia, China, and a large cast of regional rogues and trouble-makers. While these forecasts are helpful, only time will tell how the outlying world evolves. What can be said is that today, this big part of the world is littered with worrisome conditions. The list includes big powers pursuing traditional geopolitical interests, regional outlaws primed to commit aggression if the opportunity arises, and multiple inter-state frictions. It also includes frustrated countries not making progress, failing states, criminal states, and transnational threats. Finally, there are a host of other countries that are well-meaning, but live isolated and vulnerable lives in fragmented zones utterly lacking in collective security. Globalization or not, this situation adds up to a future of chaotic turbulence and trouble in many places, not tranquility everywhere.[x]

The globalization trend especially to be feared is WMD proliferation, accompanied by changes in regional conventional military balances brought about by modern weapons and doctrines. Many regions in the outlying world are already pockmarked by dangerous military imbalances and security vacuums. In several cases, strong potential predators are located next door to weak vulnerable neighbors whose security is important to the western community. The oil-rich Persian Gulf is a key example, and there are others. Especially because WMD proliferation will take place in an already-unstable setting, it has the potential to transform, in highly damaging ways, strategic relationships along the entire huge southern belt stretching from Southeastern Europe, through the Middle East, to South Asia and Asia.

Russia and China already have nuclear weapons and long-range delivery systems. A growing danger is that WMD arsenals might be acquired by such countries as India, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. An accompanying danger is that other countries might seek WMD systems in reaction, thereby producing contagious proliferation. An especially serious danger is that aggressor countries might combine WMD arsenals with improved conventional forces capable of swift offensive strikes against their neighbors. These trends are already emerging and may be robustly on the scene within a decade or less. The exact consequences are hard to foresee, but they inevitably could be highly disruptive. Widespread WMD proliferation and other damaging military trends could alter already-unstable security relationships in many places, making today's situation considerably worse in multiple regions.

As the following chart shows, nearly 20 million active-duty troops remain under arms worldwide--apart from the United States, which has about 1.4 million troops. What matters most importantly in the strategic calculus is the unbalanced distribution of forces in key regions that already are unstable for political reasons. In Eurasia, Russia today fields only about 1.2 million troops and a decaying military. It no longer has the offensive power to menace Europe, but it is far stronger than its immediate neighbors. In Asia, the Korean standoff is constantly tense, but the long-term concern is China's huge military force of nearly three million troops. China's military currently lacks the modern assets to project major power beyond its borders, but over time, modernization could provide this capability, in ways that could menace its outnumbered Asian neighbors. In South Asia, India's military is twice the size of Pakistan's. In the Persian Gulf, Iraq and Iran both field forces that are considerably larger than those of Saudi Arabia and other Arab sheikdoms. Elsewhere, the sheer amount of well-armed military forces provides a major capability for violence if they are unleashed: the Balkans is an example.

Military Forces in Key Regions[xi]

	Active Military Manpower (000's)	*Defense Spending ($ Billions, Annually)*
NATO and Europe	3,400	$ 190 B.
Russia and Eurasia	2,278	$ 78 B.
Greater Middle East	2,768	$ 66 B.
South Asia	2,009	$ 30 B.
Asia	6,815	$ 202 B.
Africa	1,005	$ 25 B.
Latin America	1,325	$ 30 B.
Total	*19,600*	*$ 621 B.*

These military imbalances might not be worrisome if they occurred in settings of stable political relations. But many of them arise in settings that are highly unstable, even volatile. In particular, situations where potential aggressors enjoy a big military advantage over outnumbered victims are an open invitation to war. The lack of collective security mechanisms in most of these regions further exacerbates the problem because aggressors are not deterred from attacking and potential victims are not assured of their security. Often, the result is an atmosphere of chronic anxiety, and occasionally war: as has occurred in the Persian Gulf and the Balkans in the past decade. As potential aggressors modernize their forces with weapons capable of offensive doctrines, this situation may worsen. WMD proliferation is deeply menacing because it promises to further exacerbate these unstable situations, thereby further heightening anxieties and setting the stage for additional conflicts.

The troubled security conditions in key parts of the outlying world contribute importantly to their prospects for progress as globalization occurs. *The key issue is not whether globalization's positive features will be helpful in outlying regions that are conducive to progress, but whether they alone can be relied upon to break the back of chaos at vital, unstable places where progress is hard to come by. An outcome this rosy seems improbable.* Globalization alone likely will not stop savage ethnic war in the Balkans, or prevent the Persian Gulf from remaining a permanent hot spot, or cure Africa's poverty, or prevent confrontation in South Asia, or make Russia favorable to the EU and NATO, or turn China into an ally of the United States. *Globalization will not solve these security problems primarily because it operates in the sphere of economics and associated politics, outside the domain of security affairs*. If these problems are to be solved, it will be primarily through security politics and policies, not globalization.

While the future is impossible to predict, hope for fast, sweeping progress in security affairs across nearly all of the outlying world seems misplaced. The idea that economic markets and natural political dynamics will empower such a wholesale transformation almost overnight is comforting. But it seriously underestimates the deeply rooted, intractable, and mounting security troubles facing the outlying world's multiple, diverse regions. Progress is not a forlorn aspiration, but a more plausible path is a slower, evolutionary progress: a checkered one that brings greater gains in some regions than in others. Over the long haul, an evolutionary progress that gradually chips away at problems -- lessening some while preventing others from exploding--could have a strong cumulative effect. But even this gradual progress will not come if economic markets and natural political forces are left to operate on their own devices. If this progress is to be achieved, it will have to come from the U.S. government and other countries collaborating together in several key arenas: politics, security, diplomacy, and economics.

Looking at where the outlying world is headed, a future of major progress everywhere seems unlikely, but a steep descent almost everywhere seems equally improbable. If a steep descent begins, the western democracies and other countries doubtless will act to halt it. Equally important, the emerging picture in the outlying world is far from entirely bleak. Although countries there will be pursuing their own interests in a setting of autarchy, most will remain inward-looking and will prefer peace to war. Globalization, moreover, will give many incentives to behave responsibly, in order to preserve their access to the world economy and other benefits flowing from cordial relations with the democratic community. Only genuine outlaw states, like Iraq and North Korea, will be permanent aggressors, but they will be few in number. Other states may be trouble-makers from time to time, but mainly in fleeting ways.

Most likely, tomorrow's outlying world will show progress in some places, coupled with an overall level of shifting tension and danger in other areas that is about the same as today or modestly higher. But this forecast assumes effective western action. Moreover, tomorrow's dangers likely will be different from today's, and they will fluctuate over time. Some of today's dangers (e.g., a new Korean war) may abate, but others may rise to take their place (e.g., a nuclear war in the Middle East), only to be replaced by others eventually. The United States may find itself temporarily struggling to find common ground with Russia in one period, and then facing trouble with China in the next. It may have to confront a Balkan aggressor one year, and then intervene forcefully in a collapsing Middle Eastern or African state the following year. A future of shifting dangers is considerably less menacing than a worldwide thunderstorm of permanent crises and wars nearly everywhere. But it is nothing to sneeze at. *It will require the United States to show a great deal more flexibility and adaptivity than was needed during the Cold War or even over the last decade.*

This middle-range forecast, however, is not the only plausible outcome. A worse future could transpire if events take a bad course, control of them is lost, and the democratic community does not respond in time. Rampant WMD proliferation is one dynamic that could bring about a steep descent, especially if it unfolds in a setting of stressful regional tensions, growing transnational threats, big power assertiveness, and western bungling. If a global thunderstorm occurs, it likely will not stem from the reappearance of a new superpower or peer competitor to challenge the western community worldwide. *Instead, it likely will come, at least initially, from the outlying world's sheer fragmentation, multipolarity, chaotic turbulence, multiple dangerous trends, and interactive dynamics.* If so, this outcome will be of small comfort to the democratic community, for a chaotically dangerous world could prove to be quite hard to handle for reasons of its own. After all, the prospect of having to put out multiple forest fires, caused by lightning striking in many separate places, is hardly a prescription for a tranquil existence.

Implications for U.S. Policy and Strategy

Globalization thus is combining with other dynamics to make the democratic community increasingly peaceful and prosperous, but the outlying world still chaotically turbulent and perhaps more so in some places. This strategic trend gives rise to important policy and strategy implications in two key areas, both of which will impose significant demands on U.S. resourcefulness and superpower leadership: mobilizing the democratic community to act in the outlying world and setting strategic goals there.

For the United States, the need to craft a strategic policy for the outlying world is not a prescription for being heavily involved everywhere. Because U.S. resources are limited, a clear sense of interests will be needed in determining where to become involved, and where to stand back. Recent trends suggest that U.S. interests are enlarging outward into new regions. But not all interests are the same in weight. In theory, U.S. interests are either vital, important, or peripheral. Vital interests are so critical that they always mandate very large efforts, sacrifices, and risks to protect them. Important interests can be critical too, but they fall into a lower category and therefore mandate a keen sense of feasibility and cost-effectiveness in deciding whether and how to protect them. Peripheral interests have intrinsic value in themselves, but normally do not justify expenditure of major resources on their behalf. This threefold distinction can be hard to apply in practice, especially when gray-area important interests are at stake. For example, some important interests can be derivative of vital interests: strongly defending them may be necessary to prevent major threats from later arising to vital interests. Yet, the costs and risks of protecting important interests sometimes can prove to be higher than originally thought, sometimes too high. Each situation must be judged on its own merits. But in general, U.S. involvements should be selective: focused on matters of truly strategic importance where the consequences of acting, or not acting, are widespread, not purely local.[xii]

The same judgment applies to the role of values in U.S. foreign policy. Especially because the United States is a global power with a major leadership role, the days are long gone when it could anchor its foreign policy in a Palmerstonian concept of pragmatic interests defined in narrow geostrategic terms. U.S. foreign policy necessarily must favor and promote the spread of democracy, humanitarianism, peaceful conduct, respect for law and rules, and international cooperation in zones beyond its old Cold War perimeters. Indeed, the widespread adoption of these values is a powerful way, over the long haul, to promote U.S. and common interests. But recognizing the important role of values does not translate into the conclusion that overly weighty burdens, unnecessary risks, and impossible dreams should drive U.S. policy. Here too, a prudent sense of selectivity and restraint is needed.

The bottom line is that U.S. interests and values are a powerful prescription for a foreign policy of activism, not passivity, toward both the democratic community and the outlying world. But an activist policy must be well-construed and guided by a clear sense of strategy. It must embody a coherent relationship between ends and means, and apply its scarce resources wisely through sound plans and programs. In particular, it must be as effective as possible. In the coming years, the hallmark of a sound U.S. foreign policy will be its ability actually to achieve its goals, rather than watch in confusion, or frustrated angst, as the future unfolds.

Owing to globalization and other dynamics, U.S. foreign policy will need to think globally: it will need to see the world as a whole because it is becoming a single place of tightening geography and shortening time. U.S. policy also will need to focus intently on the future. Nobody can pretend to know what today's changes will produce tomorrow. To a degree, the early 21st century reflects what Charles Dickens said about Europe in the late 19th century: that because it was the best and worst of times, the world seemed headed both toward heaven and in the opposite direction. If this is the case today, it says something profound about the coming agenda. The United States should not view the future as predestined to unfold along a single, linear path. Instead, it should view the future as a variable, as capable of producing a wide variety of outcomes, ranging from good to ill, depending upon how events

play out and key countries act. Above all, the United States should not adapt a passive stance by assuming that great progress is ensured by the natural forces of economics, politics, and human evolution. Some observers have said that the current era resurrects the Enlightenment's long-buried faith in progress. Perhaps so, but if progress is to come, it will have to be created out of a setting that seems equally capable of producing the opposite.

The idea that governments can play a positive role in helping shape the strategic future has gone out of fashion in recent years. Whether this is true in economics can be debated, but it is decidedly untrue in security affairs. There, wise government action will be the key to determining whether the future produces progress or descent. An activist U.S. foreign policy seems best-advised to focus on three strategic imperatives. First, U.S. policy should endeavor wisely to handle today's opportunities and challenges, while adjusting its actions as the strategic situation unfolds. Second, it should do try to encourage further progress as places where this is possible. Third, it should work with other countries to set up strong roadblocks against any major descent in global security affairs. If U.S. policy can accomplish these three key strategic tasks, it will enhance its chances to produce a safe and healthy future, where progress is possible because potentially crippling dangers have been surmounted.

Principle 5: U.S. Policy Toward the Democratic Community Will Need to Focus on Getting It to Project Organized Engagement and Power into the Outlying World.

During the Cold War, U.S. policy was compelled to focus intently on the challenge of keeping the besieged western world united and protected, while constantly staying prepared for a global war. That weighty challenge has been replaced by the vastly improved situation of today. The danger of global war is gone, as is rivalry with a determined, powerful opponent. By a wide margin, the democratic community is now the strongest and most unified actor on the world scene, possessing both immense strategic assets and appealing values. In contrast to nearly all of the 20th century, Europe is now headed toward unifying peace under democracy, and big parts of Asia and Latin America are pointed there as well. *This development makes the strategic task facing the United States far easier, for it no longer has to worry about the entire world going up in flames.*

Clearly U.S. policy should continue carefully nurturing the democratic community's health and progress, which cannot be taken for granted. Keeping the United States closely bonded to unifying Europe and key Asia allies will be critical to preserving a stable world as well as promoting progress. Nonetheless, as said before, this central strategic task is far easier than in the past, for the democratic community's further internal development is now heavily on autopilot. Many challenges lie ahead in ensuring that democracy takes hold in new converts, and in promoting fair economic competition and burden-sharing. But these are policy particulars. *The unifying strategic essence and upward direction of the democratic community is already established as a core foundation of modern life in a globalizing world.* Barring something truly disruptive or infernally stupid, this community will continue becoming more democratic, unifying internally, and prospering almost on its own.

Yet, this community faces a demanding strategic challenge. It cannot expect to remain secure and prosperous if it walls itself off from the outlying world. If this still-troubled portion of the world goes up in flames, the democratic community eventually will be consumed as well. Strategic isolationism is impossible precisely because globalization is making the world ever- more connected and interdependent. The need for a selective interpretation of involvements does not alter the fact that for good reasons, U.S. and western interests and values are marching outward into previously peripheral areas--as was evidenced by NATO's intervention in Kosovo and the Balkans. In the coming years, some interests will be truly vital: e.g., retaining access to Persian Gulf oil. Others will be powerfully derivative: i.e., not vital in themselves, but closely tied to vital interests. An example is halting WMD

proliferation in South Asia so that it does not spread to the Middle East. Still other interests will be less critical, but often important enough to merit protecting and advancing. On occasion, purely humanitarian interests and values will justify intervention, as will the need to enforce international codes of conduct. The presence of serious dangers to such compelling interests and values outside the democratic community's borders is what makes strategic isolationism implausible.

As a consequence, the democratic community needs a proactive policy of engagement, strategic shaping, and responding to dangerous events in the outlying world. Yes, the United States and its democratic partners need to define their interests carefully and act selectively: a new global crusade would be unnecessary and unwise. But the larger strategic reality is that the democratic community will need not only to act effectively in the outlying world, but also to act together as a whole insofar as possible. Combined action is needed because even though the United States is a superpower, its assets are spread thin by its global involvements, and it cannot be present everywhere at once. It needs help from allies and partners. When the democratic powers act separately, their effectiveness is diluted. But when they join together, their effectiveness is greatly magnified.

Today unfortunately, the democratic community does not have a unified policy and strategy in this arena. It is good at defending its own borders, nourishing its internal values, and promoting its own prosperity. But as for working together to project its interests, values, and power outward, it is too disunited, weak, and ineffective because it has no combined strategy and comprehensive program. As a consequence, the United States is left carrying too many burdens in the security and defense arena. It singly plays the role of projecting major military power in peace, crisis, and war because its European and Asian allies remain largely focused on defending old Cold War borders against fading threats. Even in the few arenas of security and economics where the allies are active, they heavily pursue incompatible goals and uncoordinated policies--not only in relation to U.S. policies, but in relation to each other.

Absent is the sense of democratic commitment and strength that won the Cold War. What exists instead is a potpourri of disconnected policies, many of them lacking adequate resources and combined strategy. *The specifics of these policies can be debated endlessly, but the bottom line is clear: Today's worrisome situation is a recipe for strategic drift and maybe failure.* Something better is needed by the inner core and, to the extent possible, by the entire democratic community. Fortunately, there are signs of progress: e.g., NATO's new "Defense Capabilities Initiative" in Europe, and Japan's willingness to accept some new military missions in Asia. But much more needs to be done. The United States will need to continue encouraging its allies to respond, and to work closely with them in creating combined approaches in economics and security. The allies will need to rise to the occasion with greater willpower and resource commitments. Precisely how this change is to be brought about, and how subsequent activities are to take shape, is a complex issue requiring considerable analysis and political dialogue. But as these problems are addressed, it is critical not to lose sight of the strategic basics. *Mobilizing the power and purpose of the democratic community to act effectively in the outlying world is a main challenge in a globalizing era.*

Action by the democratic community is needed because any attempt by the United States to act unilaterally would both overstretch its resources and brand it as an unwelcome hegemonic superpower. In addition, nearly all of today's existing multilateral institutions -- from NATO to APEC and the IMF-- seem overloaded and hard-pressed both to reform themselves and to cope with the complex challenges of a globalizing world. They can be brought to greater life and refocused only if their key members join together on behalf of common enterprises. While a global strategic response is needed, clearly multilateral efforts at specific places cannot be mounted by the democratic community as a whole. What will be needed are several smaller coalitions of the committed and able, composed of countries with

bedrock interests at stake in key regions, and possessing the assets and inclinations to work together. Thus, different coalitions will be needed to carry out strategic activities in Europe and its environs, Eurasia, the Greater Middle East and Persian Gulf, Africa, South Asia, and Asia.

Building such coalitions has already begun in Europe, but it is only beginning to make headway elsewhere. The core issue is not the worthiness of the enterprise, but instead its feasibility in the face of today's powerful political constraints. Only time will tell, but strong leadership efforts by the United States in all key regions can provide considerable energy and thereby elevate the chances for success. Potential allies and partners will have strong motives to act because their own interests increasingly are at stake, and cooperation with the United States and other countries can greatly magnify their ability to protect these interests. The strategic advantage of multilateralism is that it can allow many countries to commit only modest resources and still aim for ambitious goals. It thus may have more appeal than often is realized, provided countries awake to the challenges facing them.

Prospects are best in Europe, where commitment to multilateralism, and positive experience with it, is strongest owing to NATO and the EU. Today Europeans are accustomed to focusing their security policies on their own region, but their global economic interests and involvements are giving them a growing incentive to think more broadly about security--if not globally, then at least outside Europe toward adjoining regions where instability can spread to menace Europe. Experience at multilateralism is less deeply planted in the Greater Middle East, but the Persian Gulf war shows that strong coalitions can be assembled at times of great danger. The looming challenge is one of applying this lesson to build greater peacetime cooperation. Progress may be stimulated if the Israeli-Arab peace process gains momentum and WMD proliferation creates growing incentives for countries to bond together in security affairs in order to protect themselves.

Asia is a region where multilateralism has little anchoring in history, and countries are separated not only by their wary attitudes toward each other, but also by their sheer distances from one another. Yet globalization is drawing Asia together in economics and security affairs, impelling greater security cooperation if steady economic progress is to be made by the key countries. Asia already has nascent multilateral institutions: APEC and ASEAN are examples. The issue is whether they will take hold and grow in ways that affect not only politics and economics, but also security affairs. Much will depend upon whether U.S. leadership can convince such key countries as Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore, and others to begin blending their security policies and defense planning together. Prospects seem best in the arenas of peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, and maritime operations, where collaborative efforts can be aimed at protecting key sealanes while not signaling hostile intent to the sovereignty and security of any Asian country. Progress at first may be slow, but in the long run, perhaps momentum can be built.

For the United States, the attractions of success make the effort worthwhile. Cooperating with allies and partners is never easy, but history shows that when a coalition acts, it does so with great power in politics, security, and economics. Simply stated, coalitions can accomplish a great deal in enduring ways-- far more than can be achieved by countries acting separately on their own. This is the case because coalitions often are synergetic instruments: their whole is greater than the sum of their parts. Clearly the United States cannot hope to replicate the NATO experience in regions where such intense multilateral cooperation lies decades away. But efforts to create less-formal coalitions in security affairs and economics may offer viable prospects in the sense of being both potentially successful and effective enough to get the strategic job done.

If this agenda of multilateral coalition-building is pursued more intently than now, it doubtless

will be complex, demanding, and often frustrating: progress will be measured in small degrees, and experienced over a period of years and decades, not months. But two things seem apparent: If the United States does not achieve progress in this arena, it will increasingly find itself carrying weighty, overloading strategic burdens around the world almost alone. If the democratic countries and other friendly powers of key regions do not cooperate together and work with the United States, their own regions could go up in smoke, and their interests and safety along with it. To an important degree, globalization leaves all participants no other alternative but to act together: not to achieve strategic miracles, but to strengthen their capacity to handle the challenges ahead.

Principle 6: In Dealing with the Outlying World, Promoting Strategic Stability is Rapidly Becoming Not Only a Key Goal in Itself, But Also a Precondition for Attaining Progress.

Several years ago, a prevailing hope was that the outlying world would benefit powerfully from the positive trends now sweeping over the democratic community. A common expectation was that owing to irresistible forces of democracy, free-markets, and multilateral cooperation, the outlying world would itself go on autopilot, destined for a future of steady integrating progress. Whether because of globalization or in spite of it, this comforting vision recently has been going up in smoke. From Russia to the Middle East and Asia, recent downward trends almost everywhere show clearly that the countervailing dynamics of chaotic fragmentation and deterioration are too powerful for the autopilot mechanism to work on its own. In today's outlying world, there is too much growing political conflict, economic strife, social dislocation, geopolitical maneuvering, military competition, and WMD proliferation to suggest otherwise.

The key policy questions facing the democratic community are: Exactly what is to be done? How should an effective common policy and strategy take shape? *The growing turbulence in the outlying world is ample reason for a basic judgment: Before steady progress can be made there, strategic stability must first be achieved.* The term "strategic stability" does not mean stasis or a great slowdown in change: in today's world, neither are possible, and in many places, they are not desirable either. What strategic stability means is a marked lessening of the damaging conditions and dynamics that create great friction in inter-state relations and domestic affairs, and that thereby set the stage for widespread deterioration, conflict, and war. An unstable situation is prone to a big explosion any time a match is lighted. By contrast, a truly stable situation is characterized by strategic affairs that are healthy, enduring, and peace-pursuing.

If U.S. strategy is to be anchored in sensible goals, it should first be a strategy of stability, and only then a strategy of progress. The reasons are apparent. Chaos at key places in the outlying world not only endangers U.S. and allied interests, but poses a menace to peace worldwide. If allowed to fester and grow, it could propel major parts of the world, including the big powers, back toward the kind of geopolitical maneuvers and endemic conflicts that set the stage for the 20th century's long-lasting troubles. Because the democratic community's common resources are finite, it must set priorities on a "first things first" basis. Indeed, the democratic community will not be able to aim for strategic stability everywhere. Instead, it must focus on the conditions and dynamics that matter most, that affect not only local places but also multiple regions.

Equally important, a foundation of strategic stability is a precondition for enduring progress. Globalization's good features and other positive trends cannot take hold if they are implanted on quicksand. The same holds true for the inspiring values of democracy and free markets, which themselves will not take hold if the preconditions for their success are lacking. The paramount need to foster strategic stability is not a recipe for diluted values and lowered horizons. It merely means that the

horse must come before the cart if the cargo is to arrive at its destination. Strategic stability in the outlying world will be difficult to achieve, and will require hard strategic labor for years. But if stability is attained, it will help accelerate the rate at which progress unfolds.

A proactive strategy of promoting stability necessarily must be anchored in a clear sense of how the three goals of seeking economic prosperity, healthy security affairs, and democracy-building are to work together. Clearly all three goals are interactive: success at one helps achieve the other two. Equally clear, U.S. policy in endangered zones cannot aim for economic growth and democratization in the misplaced confidence that peaceful security relationships will flow in the aftermath. To an important degree, the need to create stable security affairs should be seen as a precondition for economic gains and democracy to take hold. This is how the democratic community was built during the Cold War. The same formula of cause and effect likely will apply to taming key parts of the outlying world in the coming era.

In promoting strategic stability as a foundation-layer for progress, should the United States and its democratic partners pursue a truly global strategy, or instead separate regional strategies? The answer seemingly is a sensible combination of both approaches, carried out in ways that harmonize economic and security policies. In the economic arena, as Robert Gilpin has said, global strategies are needed to help promote common rules, policies, expectations, and coordinated actions. Regional economic strategies can contribute, but only if they serve as stepping stones, not stumbling blocks, to handling truly global issues.[xiii] The same applies in security affairs. Global strategies are needed in such critical areas as arms control, diplomacy, and international law. Regional strategies are needed to mobilize the common military and security assets that will be available for use in dealing with regional problems. Whereas global strategies can lack the focused power to handle regional affairs on a case-by-case basis, regional strategies can lead to fragmentation and localism. Separately neither approach offers a stand-alone solution. But together, they can work effectively if they are properly blended in ways that make them mutually supportive.

Globalization's unifying effects create compelling reasons for the democratic community to see the world as a whole, rather than as disconnected regions. A sense of the whole will assist the critical task of setting priorities among regions, and coordinating efforts to handle each of them on behalf of a common strategic enterprise. Once this task is performed, policies can then be forged that respond to the unique features of individual regions. Most likely, U.S. strategy will seek to consolidate Europe's unification, preserve stable relations with Russia and China, defuse poisonous nationalism and ethnic hatreds in the Balkans and Caucasus, keep the lid on the explosive Middle East and Persian Gulf while dampening WMD proliferation's effects, prevent South Asia's troubles from infecting other regions, and prevent Asia from sliding into geopolitical competition as China's power grows.

In each region, U.S.-allied strategy will need to be anchored in the proper combination of goals aimed at shaping the strategic terrain, including reforming alliances, promoting broader multilateral combination, reaching out to new partners, reassuring vulnerable countries, stabilizing competitive dynamics, and deterring improper conduct. As success is achieved in preventing negative trends, emphasis can shift toward pursuing positive developments. In this way, the troubled security affairs of dangerously chaotic regions perhaps can gradually give way to an atmosphere of growing tranquility and cooperative conduct. This improving strategic stability can help set the stage for further progress in building democracy, market economies, greater wealth, and political communities. Progress in these areas, in turn, can help reinforce the trend toward strategic stability in security affairs.

The vision of strategic stability and progress put forth here does not imply that concepts of security order crafted by the United States and its close allies should be, or can be, artificially imposed on key regions. Nor does it mean that the political and economic values of countries in these regions

necessarily must mimic those of the democratic community. If stability and progress are to be achieved, they will need to be attained in organic ways that reflect the history, values, and evolving practices of the regions themselves. Ultimately they will need to be achieved by the countries of each region, not sustained by outsiders in ways not welcomed by insiders. The proper process for defining how the future should be built is multilateral consensus-building among insiders and outsiders. Equally true, all participants must be guided by legitimate interests and responsible conduct. This is the case for outsiders, but it also is the case for insiders, including those possessing the physical strength and willpower to impose their own unhealthy conceptions on their neighbors. In the final analysis, the world will not only remain a diverse place, but should remain diverse. Yet if stability and progress are to be achieved, some common themes will apply to all regions. The legal rights and legitimate interests of all countries will need to be respected, human rights will need to be honored too, and security and economics will need to work together to have an uplifting effect.

Although policies will vary among these regions, similar guidelines will apply. The United States and its partners will need to forge their multiple policy instruments together. Their diplomacy, political activities, economic policies, security efforts, and defense plans will need to work on behalf of a coherent strategy, rather than operate in separate domains or even at cross-purposes. These policy efforts must be backed by adequate resources, and be carried out by economizing plans and programs that gain the maximum mileage from the resources expended. By acting wisely in these ways, the democratic community will enhance its prospects for success in dealing with a turbulent setting where success will not come easy.

In this context, a key point made earlier merits further elaboration. One of the biggest challenges faced by U.S. strategy will be that of crafting coordinated, complementary economic policies and security policies. If these two policy components can be forged together on behalf of common purposes, they will greatly magnify the effectiveness of U.S. strategy. But if they do not work together, or even compete with each other, their impact will be greatly lessened. The specific challenges to be faced will vary from region to region. In the transatlantic relationship, collective defense already exists, but building a more harmonious economic relationship as the EU enlarges and deepens promises to be both important and difficult. In Asia, the opposite situation prevails. Prospects for cooperative economics appear good, but the region lacks collective security: its architecture is held together by bilateral ties between the United States and multiple allies. Building upon these bilateral ties to create a greater sense of multilateral cooperation likely will be a key endeavor, for its success will not only affect Asia's stability but also will have an important impact on economic progress. The same judgment applies to the Middle East and Persian Gulf, where economic progress and democracy-building are badly needed but will remain problematic unless today's crippling security problems can be lessened.

Likewise, coordinated policies will be needed in dealing with key strategic challengers: Russia, China, and India. Ushering these three big powers into the world economy makes sense as part of a strategy for market-building and global economic growth, but this step will be advisable only if there are credible assurances that they will use their economic opportunities to play constructive, not destructive, roles in security affairs. An even sterner judgment applies to outlaws and potential aggressors. Until they alter their demeanor, they will continue to need deterring through political-military pressure and economic sanctions. Offering them economic inducements can be a viable way to influence their behavior, but only if it results in them acting responsibly, rather than using aid to continue acting irresponsibly. Owing to different but equally thorny dynamics, dealing with troubled and failing states, in Africa and elsewhere, will also require coordinated economic and security policies. For most of these poverty-stricken countries, economic progress is vital, but it will not come easily, and it cannot take hold unless effective governments and security conditions are first created. The United States will not be able to help all of them, but it will be compelled to help some of them, and to do so, it will need to blend its economic and security efforts wisely.

Doubtless debates will continue raging about how to coordinate economic and security policies in specific cases. But participants in them should be able to agree on one core judgment: these two key policy instruments must be blended to support a common strategy. The same applies to using other instruments of national power. If this coordination can be achieved, a comprehensive, well-conceived strategy, led by the United States but backed by key allies, will stand a good chance to succeed: perhaps not everywhere, but at enough places to make a big difference. In this event, dealing with the outlying world's chaos will prove to be less difficult and dangerous than otherwise could be the case. If islands of strategic stability can be built there and gradually expanded outward, the chances for progress taking hold--economic progress and democracy-building--will increase in commensurate ways. To the extent this effort succeeds, the democratic community will find itself looking outward and seeing opportunities, not dangers.

Diplomacy, politics, economic activities, security efforts, and arms control can make a major contribution to this strategy. But in the final analysis, sensible western military commitments and actions will be critical. The reason is that in the turbulent outlying world, security and defense conditions will have an important bearing on whether the future produces growing stability or mounting chaos. For the United States and its allies, this reality means that they will need to remain skillful at using military power -- not only during crises and wars, but in peacetime as well.

U.S. military forces will need to remain well-armed, capable of winning wars, and able to handle the crisis interventions and other operations ahead, including peacekeeping. This will remain a top priority regardless of how the future unfolds. At the same time, these forces seem destined to play an enduringly important role in U.S. efforts to shape the strategic environment in peacetime, especially in turbulent geographic zones where critical interests and security goals are at stake. Shaping the environment will take many forms, ranging from building coalitions, to reassuring vulnerable countries, to warning potential aggressors. These disparate activities likely will be guided by a common strategic mission: laying a foundation of stability not only to safeguard U.S. and allied interests, but also to help encourage the progress coming from globalization's positive features.

The idea of using U.S. military power to help shape the strategic environment is nothing new, for it was done continuously throughout the Cold War. Back then, however, the task was different from now: to uphold the bipolar order by defending key alliances through such precepts as containment, deterrence, forward defense, and flexible response. Today the task of creating strategic stability is different because the world is no longer bipolar, but instead, considerably more complex. Today's world is vulnerable to being torn apart not by the actions of a single big enemy, but by many dynamics capable of conspiring together to create a bubbling stew of interacting troubles. Helping calm these diverse troubles before they reach the boiling point likely will be a core strategic purpose of U.S. military power.

The manner in which U.S. military forces are used also seems destined to be different from the Cold War. Back then, U.S. ground and air forces, carrying out continental strategies, were the main instruments of peacetime strategic shaping: naval forces normally played important but supplementary roles. In the coming era, the new geostrategic setting of the outlying world is elevating the role played by naval forces and operations in U.S. strategy for peacetime shaping. Clearly naval forces will remain embedded in joint operations: experience shows that jointness is the best approach to using U.S. military power effectively. All the same, U.S. strategy faces a new intellectual challenge. It is one of figuring out how to use naval power and joint maritime operations for peacetime political impact in a highly complex, fluid setting where the relationship between cause and effect is anything but clear. Mastering this challenge does not promise to be easy, but in this era of globalization, precious few things are easy.

Conclusion

Globalization is washing over the entire world, increasingly bonding its separate parts together and intensifying the pace of change. The strategic consequence is not preordained. It can be progress, or descent, or a mixture of both. Much depends upon how countries everywhere act, for in the final analysis, globalization will become what they decide to make of it. How the future will unfold is impossible to know. What can be said is that there is a big difference between the democratic community and the diverse regions of the outlying world. Whereas the democratic community seems headed toward growing progress, the outlying world is a different matter. It has the potential for progress, but major parts of it also have the potential to slide into growing chaos: in ways that might not only consume them, but also damage the democratic community. Controlling this potential chaos is a main strategic challenge: not only to protect the interests and values of the democratic community, but also to give the outlying regions a better chance to take part in the undeniably positive benefits of globalization. In important ways, the future hangs in the balance--for people everywhere.

II.

U.S. DEFENSE STRATEGY IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD: TOWARD NEW STRATEGIC PURPOSES, MISSIONS, AND FORCES

What implications do globalization and its strategic consequences pose for U.S. defense policy and strategy? While the answer is complex in its particulars, it is simple in its basics. As globalization gains steam and interacts with other trends to alter security affairs in many places, U.S. defense planning likely will be affected in important ways. Not surprisingly, a changing world means that U.S. military affairs must change along with it, including in forces, operations, and relations with allies and partners.

Things will not be transformed overnight, but a decade from now, U.S. defense planning may be carried out in ways that differ importantly from today. The task facing the United States today is to anticipate these changes and pursue them wisely, not make them at the last minute in a clumsy rush. This approach is the best way to ensure that U.S. forces not only retain their supremacy over opponents, but can also continue supporting U.S. foreign policy and national security strategy in effective ways. What will remain constant is that defense planning must always be guided by a keen sense of national interests and strategic priorities. Using diplomacy and economic aid to achieve overseas goals is one thing. Applying security commitments and military power in new ways is something else again.

Threefold Changes Ahead. U.S. defense policy and strategy should be anchored in strategic fundamentals, not surface events and fleeting newspaper headlines. This chapter's thesis of impending changes to U.S. and allied defense plans rests on three key judgments about fundamentals. To a degree they already apply today, and they will gain force in the medium term of 5-10 years, not only in the more distant future:

1. Owing to globalization and other dynamics, the democratic community likely will make further progress, but major parts of the outlying world will continue to face turmoil, not only in politics and economics, but also security affairs. This especially is the case along the "southern belt" from the Balkans to Asia. There and elsewhere, tomorrow's opportunities, dangers, and threats often will be quite different from today's.

2. As a result, U.S. national security strategy will be changing, and U.S. forces often will be required to perform different strategic missions than today, including at new places well-removed from the bases and alliances inherited from the Cold War. This will be the case not only in crises and wars, but also in peacetime, during which shaping the strategic environment will loom as an increasingly

important and challenging mission.

3. U.S. forces will themselves be changing, in response to new doctrines and structures, and to new information systems, weapons, and munitions. A decade or so from now, U.S. forces will operate much like Michael Jordan played basketball: at high speed and above the rim. The challenge will be to design and employ these ultra-sophisticated forces so that they effectively perform not only battlefield missions, but also their new political and strategic missions.

Initial changes in all three areas are already altering the strategic framework for determining U.S. defense strategy, forces, programs, and budgets. As they intensify, they will put added strain on U.S. defense preparedness efforts--not only by elevating requirements to some degree, but also by necessitating new approaches to using current resources. The task of pursuing new strategic purposes and priorities is difficult in itself. Equally difficult is creating new forces. Doing both will be harder still, for they must be blended together.

Because the world is changing rapidly, U.S. defense policy needs to be guided by a responsive sense of direction and purpose. For the past several years, defense planning--i.e., the preparing of strategy and forces, as opposing to actually using military power in crises-- has been humming along quietly outside the glare of public debate. It has been operating on assumptions made shortly after the Cold War ended, while making changes and improvements mostly at the margins. This tranquil setting is now coming to an end. It is being supplanted by a growing need for deep thinking and creativity-- in ways leading to a new strategic mentality. The future can best be addressed not by clinging to the status quo, but by mastering the coming period of change.

Gauging Future Strategic Directions. This chapter's aim is to help illuminate the defense agenda ahead. It asserts that the United States can best shape future defense plans, old or new, by answering three key questions in ways that produce an integrated response:

1. How should the United States appraise trends in geographic regions and strategic missions, and how should it craft national security policy and defense strategy in response?

2. What planning standards should the United States use to size its military forces in order to support its strategy, and how should it go about improving them?

3. How should the United States plan to employ its forces in peace, crisis, and war--in concert with its friends and allies?

This chapter's bottom line is that the United States will continue needing strong military forces not only to win wars and intervene in crises, but also to help shape the strategic environment in peacetime. In providing insights in ways that analyze, not advocate, this chapter puts forth concrete ideas for how to act, so that effective strategies, plans, and forces are produced. These ideas should be evaluated carefully before being adopted. What matters most importantly is their basic message. The United States has a viable option other than clinging to the status quo, or retrenching from world affairs because it feels overloaded, or vastly increasing its defense resources in order to stay engaged. *Instead, it can stay heavily and fruitfully involved by using available resources wisely, and by making sensible changes in its defense practices. The same applies to allies and partners. If all participants take these steps, they will stand a good chance of making a strategic success out of the coming decade.*

Toward New Strategy and New Missions in Endangered Regions

Assessing future directions in U.S. defense plans begins by analyzing where geostrategic affairs, including the geography of coming dangers and conflicts, seems headed. Owing to globalization and other dynamics, the widening division of the world into two parts clearly has general implications for U.S. plans. With the democratic community progressing toward greater peace and strength, it will be freed to devote less worry to defending its borders in multiple places against direct attack by big conventional forces . Because the outlying world is changing and may be headed toward equal or greater turmoil than now, it is a different matter. In a manner that reflects a sound sense of strategic priorities, U.S. activity and power will have to be applied there, perhaps in growing ways, in order to defend U.S. interests and achieve key security goals. But the implications of new geography do not end with this general observation, for something more specific is taking place that will affect future strategy, forces, and operations in concrete ways.

Throughout the Cold War, the United States had a distinctly "northern" emphasis. It was focused intently on defending Central Europe and Northeast Asia, including both Japan and South Korea, against communist aggression, while managing relations with the Soviet Union through arms control. The United States not only permanently deployed 330,000 troops in Europe and over 100,000 in Northeast Asia, but backed up these formations with strong commitments for rapid reinforcement in a crisis. Especially after the United States withdrew from Vietnam in the mid-1970's, other regions mattered less importantly in its defense plans. Defense of the Persian Gulf began gaining prominence only after 1980, and even then few American forces were stationed there. The Cold War's abrupt end swept away the threats to Central Europe and Japan, leaving only South Korea and the Persian Gulf still exposed to aggression. The Korean peninsula's future remains uncertain, but in the coming years, both Central Europe and Japan seem likely to become even more immune than now from direct attack on their borders. As a result, U.S. defense plans increasingly will have the luxury of taking their physical security for granted. Although the threat of ballistic missile attack on them may grow in ways requiring missile defense, the United States will face few major military requirements to help defend them with big ground, air, and naval forces in a crisis. Today the United States still stations 100,000 troops in Europe and 40,000 troops in Japan. Sizable U.S. forces may remain there, but the main reason will be larger strategic and political considerations, not defense against local surprise attack.

In the outlying world, by contrast, a new "southern belt" of growing strategic instability and danger seemingly is evolving. This belt includes several diverse regions located side-by-side, united more by the growing heat of their unstable strategic affairs than by any similarity among them. This belt begins in the Balkans, moves southward through the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, extends across South Asia, and stretches along the Asian crescent from Southeast Asia northward to Taiwan, Okinawa and ultimately, Japan. Obviously Sub-Saharan Africa is also an unstable region owing to poverty and troubled states, and although Latin America is now part of the democratic community, it still has significant problems in such areas as drug trafficking. Both regions will remain important considerations in U.S. foreign policy, and they will demand appropriate attention and resources in dealing with them. But the multiple neighboring regions along the southern belt are acquiring growing strategic importance not only because of their chaotic situations, but also because they pose looming consequences for global stability and U.S. security involvements.

Why should this southern belt be fingered as a new hot zone of rising strategic troubles that in varying ways could draw U.S. military power into it? One obvious reason is that serious tensions there already have resulted in U.S. military forces becoming involved in ways that would have surprised most observers only a decade ago. Since the mid-1990's, the United States has deployed large forces into the Balkans: first to perform peacekeeping in Bosnia, next to bomb Serbia into leaving Kosovo, then to keep the peace there. In early 1991, the United States waged a major regional war to eject Iraq from Kuwait. The effort succeeded, but since then, the United States has remained deeply entangled in the Persian Gulf in ways necessitating a steady geographic expansion of its military missions. Today about 25,000

troops are stationed there nearly full-time, and U.S. air forces regularly bomb Iraqi targets in enforcing U.N. mandates and no-fly zones. In Asia, U.S. forces still stand guard in South Korea, but a few years ago, carriers were sent southward in order to signal China to lessen its pressure on Taiwan, and growing U.S. military contacts are now being pursued with several Southeast Asian countries. Traditionally U.S. forces have not operated in South Asia, but in 1998, cruise missile strikes were launched against terrorist camps in Afghanistan, marking an initial use of U.S. forces there.

Across the southern belt, frequent U.S. military involvements thus already are a practical fact of life. Current trends suggest they may increase in scope and frequency in the coming years, in unforeseeable but potentially significant ways. *A core issue is whether these operations should be mounted as an outgrowth of current U.S. national security strategy, or instead should be accompanied by a change in the strategy itself.* Because the current strategy is still focused on Central Europe and Northeast Asia, it views the Persian Gulf as a primary concern but treats the rest of the southern belt as secondary, as a place to apply military power only episodically and in modest ways. A revised strategy would alter this perspective in ways embodying a combination of continuity and change. In Central Europe and Northeast Asia, it would continue strongly pursuing national goals, meeting alliance commitments, deterring still-existing threats, and safeguarding against the reappearance of old threats. Along the southern belt, it would continue defending the Persian Gulf in powerful ways, but it would look beyond the Gulf to address the dangers and challenges of other southern regions where the strategic stakes are high. This new strategy would be acutely aware of the big differences among the various regions there, each of which will require a unique policy response. But it also would view the southern belt as a strategic zone whose regions are interacting and face common security troubles. As a result, it would create a strategic rationale for ensuring that U.S. forces and other instrument can operate there in appropriate ways, carrying out security missions that are viewed as primary, not secondary.

The case for a newly focused national security strategy stems from the judgment that much of the southern belt seems headed toward turmoil for a set of interacting reasons, in ways that menace western interests. A core reason is the belt's strategic fragmentation and anarchy, the stubborn presence of outlaws and trouble-makers, the vulnerability of weak countries to strong neighbors, and the virility of some of its political ideologies, including nationalism in the Balkans and Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East and South Asia. Another reason is the presence of major powers in ways that magnify the southern belt's fault lines. If China begins asserting its geopolitical interests and growing power, the effect could be to destabilize Asia's already fragile security structure, which lacks the strong collective defense mechanisms of Europe. Both Russia and China are already involved in the Balkans and the Greater Middle East, in ways that create frictions with U.S. diplomacy and complicate its search for stability there. In South Asia, the intensifying Indo-Pakistani rivalry does not take place in a cocoon, for the interests of the United States, Russia, and China are involved. The active presence of the big powers along the southern belt sets the stage for transforming purely local crises into escalating events with larger consequences.

Further endangering this precarious setting is the looming acceleration of WMD proliferation along the southern belt. Already, India and Pakistan have exploded nuclear weapons and are building long-range missiles capable of carrying them. North Korea, Iraq, and Iran are also said to be pursuing WMD systems and missiles of their own, and they may succeed in deploying serious arsenals in the coming years. The prospect of these countries acquiring WMD arsenals is bad enough, but it could prove even more damaging if it triggers contagious WMD proliferation elsewhere and further destabilizes local security affairs at key places. The combination of WMD proliferation, added atop local instabilities and involved big powers, is what makes the southern belt a dangerous hot zone of future geostrategic affairs, capable of producing not only small conflicts, but also bigger political confrontations and nastier wars possibly involving WMD weapons.

The entire southern belt is not irretrievably destined to go up in flames. Yet much of it already is deeply troubled, and if current downward trends intensify and the democracies do not respond wisely, its problems could worsen. The principal danger is not necessarily that a new strategic "near-peer" will rise to challenge the United States globally, or that a large anti-western coalition will emerge anytime soon. Instead, the danger is that the multiple local problems along the southern belt and elsewhere will fester for reasons of their own, flare up in ever-shifting ways, and interact in a globalizing world to magnify each other. If so, the strategic effect could be to confront U.S. policy with many different but interconnected problems along a huge geographic expanse, and with no way to resolve them by influencing a single dominant source. During the Cold War, the United States faced global problems, but they mostly stemmed from a single source of trouble: the Soviet Union. The coming era will not produce a strategic situation nearly so simple or so readily manageable with a single-minded response.

The mounting turmoil along the southern belt and elsewhere thus creates growing pressures and incentives for the United States to examine whether and how to alter its national security strategy in response. This does not mean that U.S. strategy should abandon traditional areas, such as Europe and Northeast Asia, which will still require heavy U.S. engagement, leadership, and security commitments. *Rather, it means that U.S. strategy should upgrade the sustained attention it gives to the southern belt, which has long been a zone of peripheral focus and spotty activity.* Aside from Persian Gulf oil and some other exceptions to the rule, U.S. interests along this long belt commonly have not been regarded as truly vital. But many of them are now becoming highly important, and some are derivative of vital interests: i.e., defending them will be necessary to prevent serious threats to vital interests from emerging.

Clearly a selective approach anchored in priorities will be needed, but just as clearly, standing largely aloof seems infeasible. Along this belt and elsewhere in the outlying world, progress will not be achieved unless strategic stability is first created. Although this task will fall heavily to diplomacy and political efforts, U.S. military power inevitably will be called upon to play a contributing role: at least as much as today, perhaps more so, and in different ways than now. A principal hope is that U.S. military power, if properly embedded in a larger approach fully employing other instruments, could make an important strategic difference: not only by permitting the United States to resolve crises and win wars there, but also preventing military conflicts from occurring. Preventing war by acting wisely and strongly in peacetime has been a key strategic mission of U.S. military forces for decades. This likely will remain the case.

How would a revised strategy for the southern belt and elsewhere be composed? The United States cannot hope to solve all of the southern belt's festering problems, nor should it try to do so. But it should aim to lessen those troubles that deeply menace critical western interests and threaten to have ever-widening consequences, breeding contagious and worsening instability elsewhere. What precepts would such an approach include? Worldwide, a revised U.S. national security strategy will still be carrying out today's three key precepts of "shaping, responding, and preparing"--or precepts like them. *A revised U.S. strategy should embrace a more proactive, integrated, and systemic approach to shaping, responding, and preparing at key places along the southern belt, as well as other important places of similar turmoil.* Designing and carrying out such a strategy does not promise to be easy, for it will require synthetic thinking as well as careful handling of many complex nuances. But recognizing the need for a new strategy is the first, critical step in the right direction. Examples of steps already being taken include talks with friends and allies about creating regional cooperative defense measures in response to WMD proliferation in the Greater Middle East and Asia. Progress on these counter-WMD initiatives, coupled with enhanced planning for conventional defense operations by U.S. forces and such alliances as NATO, would reflect the type of systematic approach contemplated here.

Importance of Strategic Shaping Mission.

How will U.S. military power and other policy instruments be employed there in advancing national interests and pursuing high-priority goals? On occasion, U.S. forces may be used to intervene in crises or wage war: e.g., to defend Persian Gulf oilfields and other key assets, or to rebuff attacks against close friends, or to enforce critical norms of conduct. *But on a daily basis, the regular and highly important mission will be peacetime environment-shaping for the strategic purpose of promoting favorable changes while dampening chaos and preventing damaging trends.* That is, U.S. forces and other instruments will be used to help pursue such political aims as:

- Maintaining influence, reassuring friends, creating partnerships and coalitions, and pursuing outreach toward big countries like Russia and China.

- Establishing power balances, reducing tensions, discouraging arms races, signaling resolve, warning trouble-makers, and deterring threatening behavior.

Strategic environment-shaping is a servant of U.S. interests, but it does not mean the arrogant application of U.S. military power, in ways suggesting superpower dominion and disdain for the values and traditions of a region. Nor does it mean crude balance-of-power politics in ways reminiscent of the late 19th century. What it means is collaborating with peace-minded countries, in consensual and constructive ways, to protect their security, to promote multilateral cooperation, and to enhance stability across their entire region. Strategic shaping is respectful of the legitimate interests of those countries that choose to remain outside this collaborative zone. It actively pursues cooperative military ties with former adversaries seeking productive relations with democracies. It applies coercion when necessary, but only against countries who use their own military power to advance illegitimate interests, and to bully or conquer their peaceful neighbors. Rather than impose superpower domination, strategic shaping seeks to build stability from the ground up, by helping countries live peacefully and encouraging them to work together to pursue progress in ways that reflect their own values and visions.

This kind of strategic shaping has become increasingly important in recent years in all major theaters, including Europe, Asia, and the Persian Gulf. A main implication of a globalizing world, one leaving some critical regions tottering between progress and turmoil, is that the strategic shaping mission likely will become more important still, including along the southern belt. Indeed, it may play a critical role in determining whether wars are fought more often than now, or less often. *The heart-and-soul of strategic shaping is using military forces in peacetime to bring about stable conditions and constructive changes that likely would not evolve on their own.* Strategic shaping within the democratic community often is relatively easy because most countries are sympathetic to U.S. goals, which normally serve their own interests. Strategic shaping in the outlying world will be harder because the political conditions are less easy to influence, and some countries have bullying agendas different from those of the United States and menacing to their neighbors. Dealing with them often will require a firm and balanced response.

Recent experience shows that using military forces for peacetime shaping in difficult areas is an activity that must be planned carefully and carried out wisely. If done improperly, it can achieve little or even backfire. But if done properly, it can have a salutary effect: if not by wholly transforming the geopolitics of volatile regions, then by helping stabilize them in key ways. The amount of military power committed will depend upon the requirements posed by U.S. political goals in each region. Most often, a small dose of forces will be needed, but in difficult and dangerous situations, more may be required. Overall, the turmoil and instability of the large southern belt and elsewhere could necessitate more military power, sustained on a more regular basis, than is now the case. Exactly how much more is to be seen, but most likely, more than the 25,000 troops now stationed in the Persian Gulf.

Across the southern belt and elsewhere, the common U.S. agenda of strategic shaping likely will be one of promoting stability and progress, but its specific goals and concerns will vary among the regions because their endangering conditions are so different from each other. In southeastern Europe, U.S. policy likely will focus on protecting Turkey and the eastern Mediterranean, dampening raging nationalism and ethnic rivalries in the Balkans, and reaching out to the turbulent but oil-rich Caucasus in limited ways. In the already-hot Greater Middle East, protecting western access to Persian Gulf oil will remain primary, but U.S. policy will face the bigger problem of dealing with outlaws, enduring tensions among several states, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and WMD proliferation. In South Asia, U.S. policy will focus on stabilizing the Indo-Pakistani rivalry in a nuclear age, while discouraging tensions and proliferation there from infecting other regions. In murky Asia, the strategic challenge will be protecting the commercial sealanes along the Asian crescent, enhancing the security of allies and friends, and seeking cooperation with China while being prepared to deter it if it begins asserting its growing power on behalf of menacing goals. In different ways, similar judgments apply to Africa and Latin America too. The demanding challenge will be to use U.S. military power and other instruments, working multilaterally with allies and partners, to dampen these multi-region dangers and especially to prevent them from infecting each other in ways that could inflame the entire southern belt and elsewhere.

Future Directions in U.S. Military Strategy

If a revised national security strategy along these lines is adopted, it will need to be accompanied by an adoptive military strategy, one capable of supporting it. A revised U.S. military strategy likely will also embody a mixture of continuity and change. It will continue relying on strategic forces to deter nuclear attack on the United States and its allies. It will continue meeting defense commitments in such traditional areas as Central Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf through a combination of overseas presence and power projection from the United States. But its military bases in these three regions will no longer function solely to support deployed forces and receive reinforcements in a crisis. They will now acquire the added, new mission of themselves serving as regional hubs of power projection, so that U.S. and allied security involvements can be projected into outlying areas in peace, crisis, and war. A key purpose will be to provide assets for missions and operations along the southern belt and other endangered areas.

If a revised U.S. military strategy is to be adopted, it should continue providing ample scope for both unilateral and multilateral operations. The United States always will need to be capable of acting unilaterally in defense of its vital interests--for a superpower, this is a strategic constant. Yet in virtually all theaters, multilateralism has been a key practice in the past, and will remain so in the future. This is the case for both political and military reasons. The twofold advantage of forging a revised strategy is that it can help produce better U.S. forces while also motivating key allies and partners to create better forces of their own. The byproduct can be better forces for both U.S.-only operations and combined operations with allies and partners.

The U.S. military strategy needed to carry out new missions in the southern belt and elsewhere will be different from the strategy of the past. This will be the case not only because of the new geography and security challenges being addressed, but also because the nature of U.S. military missions and operations will be different. For the last several decades, U.S. military strategy mostly has been one of fixed positional defense through continental operations. That is, U.S. defense plans focused on defending Central Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf through a combination of stationary overseas presence there, backed by the capacity to send large U.S. reinforcements to these locations for local defense against direct cross-border aggression. The U.S. Army and Air Force were especially continental and stationary in their outlook. But even the Navy, notwithstanding its wider maritime horizons, often found itself acting as the handmaiden of this strategy, including defending sealanes

linking the United States to these specific places.

By contrast, a new military strategy for the southern belt and elsewhere will be neither positional nor continental in its core features. Instead, it will focus on applying military power at ever-shifting locations, depending upon the ever-shifting needs of the moment. To apply this power, U.S. military strategy will need to rely more heavily on power projection, carried out flexibly and adaptively as conditions change, and sometimes mounted in distant places that today might seem surprising. In peacetime, strategic shaping missions often will allow U.S. forces to move at a deliberate pace. But when direct intervention in crises and wars becomes necessary, U.S. forces will need to project swiftly and operate decisively, sometimes in places where they have little prior experience and few advanced preparations.

Moreover, U.S. forces mostly will not be carrying out continental operations. Instead, their operations will be heavily littoral. That is, they will come from the sea and air, and they will operate near shorelines, rather than hundreds of miles inland. This especially will be the case in such critical regions as the Balkans and eastern Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, South Asia, and the Asian crescent. Both the Persian Gulf war and the Kosovo war took the form of power projection missions conducted in mostly littoral areas. They likely will be forerunners of future crises and wars, as well as peacetime operations.

Clearly joint forces will be needed to pursue this military strategy while also carrying out modern U.S. military doctrine. Strategic shaping missions often will be performed by air and naval forces, which quickly can move from place to place, supported by ground forces as needed. Requirements for crises and wars will depend upon the situation, but in general, traditional calculations will apply. The Kosovo conflict shows how in special cases, air power and sea power alone can win a war. But the bigger and more demanding Persian Gulf war shows that potent ground forces often will be critical too. The key point is that U.S. forces should always retain the physical capacity to mount a robust joint response, for while they can always scale back by using only one or two services, they cannot swiftly send three services if only one or two are prepared to act.

In essence, this new military strategy will be a joint strategy of peacetime strategic shaping, swift wartime power projection, and decisive strike operations. Because this strategy often will come from the sea, it will have a strong maritime dimension, but it will need to be carried out by joint forces from all components. Whether such a revised military strategy for the southern belt and elsewhere will be adopted is to be seen. If so, it will be only one part of overall strategy (which will include other missions and commitments), but it will be a quite important part. Like all strategy departures, this one should be studied and debated before it is adopted. What cannot be debated is that new U.S. military operations along the southern belt and elsewhere already are a fact of life, and may grow. Today the U.S. military is amply capable of defending Central Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf. But it is not well-prepared for operations elsewhere along the southern belt and similar distant places. U.S. forces themselves possess most of the necessary structure and equipment. But they lack such critical accompanying features as a well-construed overseas presence in key regions, a well-distributed network of bases, infrastructure, and prepositioning, and supporting alliances and coalitions. Creating such assets in the coming years will go a long way to determining whether, and to what degree, U.S. military operations are to succeed in achieving their strategic goals.

Regardless of the southern belt's exact role, the need for the U.S. military to stay fully prepared for wars and crisis interventions will remain a top priority. Yet, the act of determining how U.S. forces can best be used to perform peacetime strategic shaping also will be a constant challenge in the coming years. Not only will this mission be important, but it will be carried out in ways quite different from the

Cold War. Back then, U.S. forces were used in peacetime to help manage the bipolar confrontation. Focused mostly on defending continental alliances, they primarily were guided by such familiar, well-oiled precepts as containment, deterrence, forward defense, and flexible response. Their efforts were led by ground and air forces, with naval forces playing important but complementary roles. By contrast, today's strategic setting is not bipolar, and it is not even mostly continental. The old precepts cry out to be supplemented by new precepts that better spell out the relationship between military means and political ends in peacetime. Future shaping operations will be carried out by joint forces, but often they will be heavily maritime in nature, and naval forces will perform a more critical role than during the past. Precisely how shaping missions will be carried out on a worldwide basis is to be seen, and doubtless will depend upon how the future unfolds. What can be said is that this arena will impose strong, new demands for fresh thinking about U.S. military strategy and defense plans in the coming years.

Creating New Force-Sizing Standards

What kind of military forces and capabilities will the United States require in its coming years in order to support its evolving strategy? Efforts to answer this important question should begin by acknowledging the major strides that U.S. forces already have taken to improve their capabilities for waging war and helping attain political goals. Back in the mid-1970's, the immediate aftermath of the Vietnam War, U.S. forces were commonly judged to be in troubled shape. Morale was low, readiness was eroding, and the weapon systems of all three services were aging. Since then, they have rebounded strongly to become, beyond question, the world's best in quality and combat power. High-quality people, better training, good readiness, and modern weapons have worked together to help produce this turnabout. A major contributor also has been the progress made in creating better operational capabilities by each service component, and by the services working together jointly.

Two decades ago, the operational capabilities of U.S. forces were considerably less impressive than now. In virtually all places overseas, initial defense plans were anchored in already-deployed assets because the United States lacked the capacity swiftly to project its large homeland-based forces in time to make a critical difference. U.S. air forces may have been able to win the air battle, but they lacked a strong capacity to help contribute to the land battle by destroying enemy forces and logistic support. U.S. ground forces were able to generate considerable stationary firepower, but they lacked the capacity to maneuver adroitly and otherwise show mastery of the operational art. U.S. naval forces were able to control the seas, but they lacked a capacity to contribute importantly to helping the air and ground forces in major continental operations. These deficiencies, coupled with shortcoming in allied forces, resulted in justifiable worry about the capacity to defend Central Europe, the Korean peninsula and Japan, and the Persian Gulf oilfields.

Since then, the progress made has been considerable. The U.S. military has greatly enhanced its power-projection capacity by building impressive strategic mobility forces. The combination of increased overseas prepositioning, strategic airlift, and strategic sealift has resulted in today's capacity swiftly to deploy nearly all U.S.-based active combat forces in a matter of a few weeks and months. Today, U.S. air forces not only possess unchallenged mastery of the air battle, but also can contribute heavily to the land battle with precision strikes against enemy combat formations, logistic support, and strategic infrastructure. U.S. ground forces—Army and Marines—now can fire and maneuver with high speed and powerful effect while conducting both offensive and defensive operations. This capacity allows them to defeat decisively larger and well-armed enemy forces. U.S. naval forces not only dominate the high seas, but can also bring their long-range firepower to bear to influence importantly the land and air battles. Equally important, all three components are developing an improved capacity to operate jointly together, and to draw upon each others' strengths in dealing with a host of different military environments.

None of these developments mean that today's U.S. forces are perfect or that all risks have been eliminated. But the situation today is vastly better than that of twenty-five years ago. In the past decade, U.S. forces have been tested in two regional wars: the Persian Gulf and Kosovo. In both cases, they worked with allied forces to win decisively, with few losses to themselves. Today, dangers still exist at key regional hotspots. But if war were to erupt in the Persian Gulf or Korea, U.S. and allied forces might encounter trouble at first, but they eventually would prevail. Their clear capacity to win decisively, perhaps quickly and easily, is a formidable deterrent to aggression occurring at all—there or elsewhere.

What must be remembered is that this transformation did not occur easily. It came about as a result of hard strategic and military labor carried out consistently for more than two decades. Nor should today's advantageous situation be taken for granted. Preserving it will require equally hard labor backed by sufficient resources. The U.S. military will need to remain attentive to the shifting demands of remaining decisively superior in regional wars and other conflicts, including those erupting at unexpected places. Future opponents will be improving their forces with higher-quality weapons, pursuing asymmetric strategies aimed at slipping the U.S. military punch, and acquiring WMD systems. The U.S. military will need to retain and develop the capacity to prevail across a wide spectrum of future conflicts ahead. Even as the U.S. military continues to improve in operational terms, the U.S. government will need to continue thinking insightfully about how its military power can best be used to exert advantageous political influence through strategic shaping in peacetime. Because the Cold War created a static bipolar world, peacetime shaping was a straightforward process of supporting alliances and deterring enemies. Because the emerging era will be more multipolar and fluid, the shaping process will be considerably more complex, and doubtless demanding.

For military and political reasons, a high degree of U.S. military preparedness will continue being needed. Even as the U.S. military remains prepared, it will have to undergo change, for it is experiencing its own internal transformation even as the world is evolving toward an unknown destination. Sound U.S. defense plans for employing forces overseas in peace, crisis and war will be required. Forging them for today's situation and tomorrow's will be one of the most important challenges, for these plans will help determine not only how the U.S. military evolves, but also how it is employed to carry out national strategy.

In this context, a key issue arises. Regardless of whether new geographic missions are embraced fully or partly, U.S. national security strategy and military strategy likely will mutate in response to a changing, globalizing world of money and power. To what degree should the current force-sizing standard of being prepared for two "Major Theater Wars" (MTW's) in overlapping time frames change along with them? The answer may not be apparent, but the question merits serious asking because the future will require a force-sizing standard that acts as part of the solution.

The role of a force-sizing standard is both to determine the size of the U.S. force posture and to explain the posture's strategic and military rationale in public. In less-visible ways it also has a major impact on defense programs, budgets, and force allocations among the key commands. The 2- MTW standard has been playing this role since 1993, when it was first installed. Its positive contributions are severalfold. It has linked U.S. force levels to clear threats and plausible wars, while reducing calculations of force requirements to a simple numerical algorithm. By proclaiming the need for a two-war posture, not one war or three wars, it has boiled defense planning down to a single-point solution. It has helped build a broad political consensus for the current posture, establishing both a ceiling over the posture and a floor under it. The 2-MTW standard achieves this end with arithmetic proclaiming that more forces would be superfluous and fewer forces would be inadequate. Seasoned military officers and operations researchers may blanch at this formula because they know reality is more complex, but the 2-MTW standard thus far has gotten the job done in the public arena. Meanwhile, it has allowed the Pentagon to resolve its internal debates by focusing on two clearly defined wars, whose postulated

features have been developed in satisfying detail.

This standard, nonetheless, apparently is now coming to the end of its useful life. Owing to problems allegedly embedded in it, critics have faulted in on several grounds. One criticism is that the 2-MTW standard lacks credibility because it is anchored in the allegedly faulty premise that two big wars will occur concurrently. A second criticism is that it anchors the U.S. defense rationale too single-mindedly in fleeting threats: both the Iraqi and North Korean threats could fade from the scene, but others could remain or appear. A third criticism is that it ignores Europe, and seems to relegate peacetime shaping missions, along with preparing for other crises and wars, to backburner status. Yet another criticism is that DoD does not take being fully preparing for two wars seriously in its own programming, even though failure to do so comes across as a major deficiency in U.S. defense preparedness. A final criticism is that the two-MTW standard makes it hard for the Department of Defense to prepare for other missions or to allocate forces in a flexible manner when other crises arise. A similar drumbeat coming from all of these criticisms is that the Department of Defense allegedly is too locked into a simplistic and rigid formula that, while performing valuable internal functions, no longer adequately looks outward at emerging requirements, priorities, and political necessities.

Regardless of how these specific criticisms are appraised, the core issue is whether the 2-MTW standard continues to provide a sound strategic paradigm for viewing the future. *If a new standard is needed, the reason is to do a better job of measuring force needs in the coming era and offering a credible strategic rationale that can endure.* In order to perform both functions, a new standard must reflect how the strategic purposes of U.S. military power are changing. Defending the Persian Gulf and South Korea (the locations of the 2 MTW's) will remain important in shifting ways, but in the coming years, other strategic missions in other places--in peacetime and wartime--will be gaining prominence as well. A new standard should take these missions into account, in ways reflecting the primary operations of U.S. forces and their emerging roles in national strategy.

The idea of creating new force-sizing standards is one that should be approached through careful study, for many issues must be considered. Broadly speaking, there are three alternatives: new contingency-based standards, capability-based standards, and strategy-based standards. Contingency-based standards would continue to size and design U.S. forces on the basis of wartime needs: e.g. enough forces for 1.5 MTW's or 2.5 MTW's instead of today's 2.0 MTW's. Capability-based standards would aspire to determine the force characteristics needed for a wide spectrum of operations: e.g., sufficient land forces to provide a robust mixture of infantry, armored, mechanized, and air assault units. The same applies to air and naval forces. Strategy-based standards would look beyond wartime contingencies and combat capabilities to determine the forces needed to carry out the key precepts of national security strategy. All three options have their advantages and disadvantages. The tradeoffs need to be evaluated carefully before making a decision. The key point is that today's standard is not frozen in concrete. If another approach is deemed better, the door can be opened to adopting it.

Without pretending to settle the issue, this study reasons that strategy-based standards, supplemented by analysis of contingencies and capabilities, may work best. This approach's key advantage is that it would anchor force planning in a stronger strategic foundation. This approach was used successfully for most of the Cold War, during which U.S. forces were sized primarily to carry out national strategy with a broad spectrum of capabilities, and secondarily to conform to the dictates of contingency plans. In this old but new approach, U.S. forces would be sized to carry out the three key precepts of national security strategy: shaping, responding, and preparing--or their successors. Once this key task is accomplished, forces can be fine-tuned to perform specific contingencies and provide a flexible portfolio of assets.

Illustratively, a strategy-based approach can be brought to life by anchoring U.S. defense plans

in a nested hierarchy of three new standards that together provide a reliable measure of enduring military needs and a credible strategic rationale for the resulting posture. The first two standards are primary: the chief mechanisms for determining force needs for shaping, responding, and preparing because they focus on the most common strategic missions of U.S. forces and high probability events. The third standard is supplementary, ensuring effective forces in more demanding, less-probable events:

Standard 1: Forces for Normal Strategic Missions. Its purpose is to ensure that during conditions short of major war (i.e., 95% of the time), the three major regional commands --EUCOM, CENTCOM, and PACOM--always have enough forces assigned to them to perform their normal duties, such as training, working with allies, performing peacekeeping, and responding to small-to-medium crises and conflicts. Such forces could include overseas-stated assets plus assigned units based in the United States. For example, this standard might allocate a posture of three divisions, five fighter wings, 2-3 CVBGs and an ARG to each command. In addition, it would withhold a sizable reserve, under national command, for flexible use in these regions or elsewhere.

Standard 2: Forces for a Single MTW, While Performing Normal Missions Elsewhere. Its purpose is to ensure that U.S. forces swiftly can concentrate to win a single big regional war, in varying places while not seriously denuding the other major CINCs of forces needed to carry out their normal missions. In event of a Persian Gulf war, for example, this standard would allocate forces already assigned to CENTCOM plus the strategic reserve in order to create an adequate wartime posture. Meanwhile, EUCOM and PACOM would retain control of most or all of the forces normally assigned to them. Thus, their normal operations would not be severely degraded. A similar calculus would apply to wars in other theaters.

Standard 3: Forces for More Wars, or Bigger Wars. Its purpose is to ensure that in event of more demanding wartime situations than Standard 2, U.S. forces will be adequate to the task if full use is made of the opportunity to concentrate them. This standard would examine force needs for two MTW's in overlapping time frames. It also would examine force needs should a bigger war, well-larger than today's MTW's, erupt. It would strive to concentrate enough forces to meet needs in these situations, albeit at the sacrifice of temporarily denuding other commands of their forces.

These new standards thus move to the forefront those missions that U.S. forces spend nearly all their time performing: normal operations and periodic waging of single regional wars. They are not blind to more demanding wartime situations. But their main effect is to ensure that defense plans address highest-priority needs for Standards 1 and 2, and only then buy additional insurance for Standard 3--not the other way around. Their intent is to focus plans intently on the strategic missions of greatest activity and emphasis, and publicly to explain the rationale for the U.S. defense posture in these terms.

Initial appearances suggest that these standards do not call for radically different force levels than those required by the 2-MTW standard. Instead, they provide a new and potentially better way to think about how existing U.S. forces are used and how they best can be improved. The current standard provides a single approach to planning: two large force packages for waging two big MTWs. By contrast, the new standards provide a wide spectrum of valuable approaches. For normal conditions, they disperse forces by creating four medium-sized packages: three for the major overseas CINCs and one held in reserve. For dealing with a single MTW, they concentrate forces to provide a single big package, plus two medium-sized packages for use elsewhere. For dealing with more and bigger wars, they concentrate forces even more, to create two big packages or an even bigger single package. *Their common theme is that they focus on how to create appropriate force packages for the full set of purposes and missions ahead, not only for the low-probability event of waging two big wars at the same*

time.

Their effect will be to provide a fresh sense of priorities in ways that can enhance the U.S. military's flexibility, adaptiveness, and across-the-board performance. They will help provide alternative lenses for viewing candidate programs, and they will reward those that provide powerful strategic benefits in more ways than one. For example, they will cast a favorable light on measures for better infrastructure in outlying areas that help U.S. forces both to perform peacetime shaping missions and to wage major wars.

Like all standards, these standards should be applied sensibly, with their interplay in mind. Standard 1 should be employed not only for its own purposes, but also to help create adequate capabilities for Standards 2 and 3. Likewise, Standard 2 should be broadly targeted, in ways that have positive effects on the other two standards. Standard 2 calls for being prepared to fight a single major war, but not only one kind of war in one place. Rather, it means that U.S. forces should be able wage different kinds of wars, varying in location, strategy, and operations. It mandates being prepared for single wars in Europe, the Middle East/Persian Gulf, Korea, and across Asia. The flexible capacity to wage these different kinds of wars will provide an inherent capacity to wage more than one war at a time. Standard 3 no longer will rule the roost, but can be used to identify cost-effective measures that help U.S. forces fight not only two wars, but also one war. Examples include strategic mobility, C4ISR systems, war reserve munitions, and stocks: areas where preparing for multiple wars still will make sense.

A guiding theme is that future defense plans should ensure that Standard 1 and 2's goals are solidly met even as Standard 3's needs, as a still important insurance policy, are amply addressed. They should ensure that pursuit of Standard 3 measures does not result in loss of Standard 1 and 2 assets. Standard 1 and 2 programs can be tailored with the goal of also enhancing Standard 3 capabilities. When unique Standard 3 measures make sense for reasons of their own, they should be funded. *By prioritizing this way, the Department of Defense will build forces fully capable of meeting Standards 1 and 2, while still preserving a robust capacity for Standard 3.*

In using these three standards, this strategy-based approach will be more complex and harder to explain than contingency planning for two MTW's. But it is no more complex than Cold War thinking. *It would create a public rationale that rings true, and it would provide a force posture that reflects the full strategic purposes of national strategy.* It would help ensure that DoD programs and budgets flow in the direction of enabling the services and CINCs fully to carry out the peacetime and wartime missions that actually must be performed in today's world. It would reduce the risk that the Pentagon, in striving for a 2-MTW posture, will leave itself inadequately prepared not only to fight one war, but even to carry out its normal duties, which play a critical role in national strategy. Simply stated, this approach points toward a sound force posture because it is anchored in a balanced sense of strategic purposes and priorities.

An added benefit is that this approach would better enable the Department of Defense to develop plans and forces for performing new missions along the southern belt. It would relieve defense planning from being so fixated on big wars in the Persian Gulf and Korea that other conflicts and places might go unaddressed. It would allocate sufficient forces to the three major commands, all of which will be performing missions along the southern belt and elsewhere. It would free them from plans that solely employ very large forces, thereby allowing them to develop plans for medium-sized projection and strike packages: the kind of forces that likely will be appropriate for most key missions there. In these ways, it would help facilitate the transition to a new military strategy that makes sense not only for the southern belt, but in all other endangered regions in the years ahead.

These three standards are put forth as illustrations, not a fixed blueprint. What they help illustrate is that the recent past need not be prologue. The existing 2-MTW formula offers one option for navigating the future, but it is not the only viable option. Creative thinking can produce other approaches with attractions of their own. They can be articulated in enough detail to provide concrete guidance for sizing forces, allocating them among missions, and setting program priorities for improving them. The challenge is to develop a full set of options, analyze them, and choose one not because it made sense in the past, but because it offers promise of working best in the future.

Building Flexible, Adaptive Forces For New Strategies and Missions

What kind of U.S. forces will be needed to carry out tomorrow's strategies, missions, and sizing standards, including those outlined here? Future U.S. forces will need to remain capable of waging two MTW's, should that improbable step become necessary. But maintaining this capability will not be their most valuable characteristic. They will need to be highly capable of peacetime strategic shaping, especially in dangerous places, where their presence can greatly enhance stability. They will need to be capable of responding swiftly and decisively to a full spectrum of crisis and wartime contingencies from large to small, including peacekeeping, strike operations against WMD-armed opponents, and interventions against determined opponents skillfully employing asymmetric strategies aimed at slipping the U.S. punch. They also will need to have the capacity to perform strategic U-turns, to switch to new missions and operations fast enough to deal with a rapidly shifting global setting.

These multiple assets add up to a strategic need for a flexible and adaptive force posture, one that can perform many different missions in frequently changing ways and thereby attain national goals. As a result, future U.S. forces should not be designed with a single script in mind, whether two MTW's or anything similar. Instead, they can best be preserved and built with an approach resembling that of an estate planner who assembles a diverse portfolio of stocks, bonds, and other investments in order to provide a robust combination of liquid assets, short-term growth, and long-term security. *In similar ways, U.S. forces can be tailored to provide a balanced portfolio of assets whose diverse sub-components can be selectively brought together in ways that meet the needs of the moment as well as enduring challenges of the future.*

Flexibility and adaptiveness comes from a force posture that possesses diverse assets that can be combined and recombined to perform ever-shifting missions. To an impressive degree, these characteristics already exist in U.S. forces. As the following chart shows, this is the case partly because all service components have sizable assets. Together, they provide 13 active ground divisions plus similar reserves, 20 fighter wings, and 11-12 carrier battle groups, backed up by modern C4ISR assets, large strategic mobility forces, and a well-endowed infrastructure at home. The stationing of 235,000 troops, supported by the ability to deploy another 500,000 in a crisis, provides the U.S. military a flexible capacity to project sizable forces to many key corners of the globe.

Current U.S. Defense Posture: 2000[xiv]

	Active	*Reserve Component*
Army Divisions	10	8
o Separate Brigades	-	18
Marine Divisions & Air Wings	3	1
Air Force Fighter Wings	12	8
o Bombers	163	27
Navy Carriers	11/12	-

o ARGs	12	-
o Other Major Combatants	163	-
DoD Military Manpower	1.35 million	865,000

In addition, all services contain considerable diversity within their ranks. The Army has a mix of armored, mechanized, light infantry, airborne, and air assault forces. The Air Force has strategic bombers, air interceptors, and multi-mission aircraft that can perform deep strike, interdiction, close air support, and reconnaissance roles. The Navy provides carriers, attack wings, cruise missiles, surface combatants and submarines that can control the seas and project power ashore. The Marines provide integrated ground and air forces that can perform amphibious assault missions while also working with the Army in sustained land operations. The growing capacity of the services to combine together to perform joint operations, of course, provides considerable synergy and added flexibility. These characteristics allow the Department of Defense to get substantial mileage out of the current forces.

Nonetheless, the current posture is 30% smaller than during the Cold War, and its shrunken size places limits on how many missions it can perform. For temporary periods, it can surge its efforts, but if an abnormally fast pace of tempo is continued over an extended period, the posture will be overstretched beyond its limits. Because quantity matters in the strategic calculus, the question arises: How many forces will be needed in a globalizing world? The same as today, or less, or more? A few years ago, critics often said that the prospect of steady progress toward a stable world translated into a need for fewer forces than now. Some argued in favor of force reductions in order to invest the savings into faster modernization. Recently, however, the prospect of world affairs becoming more turbulent has been giving rise to a reappraisal in many quarters. A growing number of observers are expressing alarm about the force posture allegedly being stretched too thin by current missions, and fear that these missions may become more numerous tomorrow. No consensus has yet emerged, but today's talk is mostly that the force posture should stay level or even grow somewhat in order to reduce mounting strains and/or perform new missions.

This chapter's three new force-sizing standards point toward a future force posture in the vicinity of today's model, not appreciably smaller or far larger. This is the case for each standard considered individually. Sizable forces will be needed to carry out normal missions *(Standard 1)*, to wage a single MTW while keeping other key theaters stable *(Standard 2)*, and to provide a supplementary capacity to fight more and bigger wars *(Standard 3)*. Their combined effects reinforce this conclusion, for they act together to erect three powerful barriers against steep reductions. Properly interpreted, these standards create no single-point requirement, below which the remaining forces will be clearly inadequate, and above which, added forces will be clearly superfluous. Yet even when an already-existing posture is reasonably aligned with strategic requirements, small additions and subtractions often can make a big difference. While less forces can cause strategic damage, more forces can be beneficial because they provide added flexibility, missions, and insurance.

If a decision is made to enlarge today's posture, first priority likely will go to adding so-called "Low Density/High Demand" (LDHD) forces from all services. These are units with highly specialized capabilities whose small size is now being stretched thin by growing requirements for using them in regular overseas operations, such as peacekeeping and crisis interventions. Examples include Air Force C4I and defense suppression aircraft, Army military police and construction engineers, and Navy special operations forces. Adding assets in these critical areas could greatly enhance the U.S. military's ability to perform these missions, while enlarging the total posture in only small ways.

As for major combat formations, the Army is unlikely to need additional active divisions and brigades. Priority already is being given to enhancing the readiness of fifteen reserve component brigades so they can participate in major combat operations, if necessary. But the Army may need

selective additions in special combat units, such as long-range fires, and in combat support and service support (CS/CSS) assets. Today over one-half of the Army's CS/CSS structure is placed in RC status. This could constrain the Army's ability to fight one major war, much less two at the same time. It already compels the Army to draw on RC support units to perform lengthy peacekeeping roles, as has been the case in the Balkans. Selective expansion in these areas could enhance the Army's strategic responsiveness. The same applies to the Air Force, whose performance of new-era missions could be enhanced by adding active-duty pilots, mechanics, and support personnel. USAF's twenty fighter wings seem adequate for wartime missions, but the current structure of having only twelve active wings, with the other eight in RC status, is being stressed by overseas rotation and crisis response missions. Shifting two wings to active status, or even adding two active wings to the current posture, may make sense in the coming years.

The Navy's posture is already the smallest in many years. The current posture includes 11-12 CVBGs, 171 surface combatants and attack submarines, 40 amphibious ships, and 75 mine warfare and logistic support ships. The total of 316 "battle force ships" is well-down from the higher levels of 567 ships only a decade ago. The Navy's size seems headed further downward in the coming years, for although better quality ships are being built, their numbers are not adequate to offset retirements. The worrisome consequence is that the Navy already is hard-pressed to meet its training requirements, perform steady-state overseas presence in all major theaters, and react to growing missions for peacekeeping and crisis response.

Given the need for a large rotational base, current forces are meeting ARG deployment goals but often fall short of CVBG goals. In 1998, a CVBG was deployed only 40% of the time in the Mediterranean, 67% in the Pacific, and 82% in Southwest Asia. In 1999 similar shortfalls were experienced in the Mediterranean and the Pacific. In 1999, the Navy responded to the Kosovo war by concentrating forces there, but this strained other theaters and missions. In the future, this situation of declining overseas presence and stressful concentrations could worsen at a time when requirements for strategic shaping, peacekeeping, and crisis response are not declining and even growing. Illustratively, adding an additional CVBG could elevate on-station time from 75% of current goals to 85% or better--a useful contribution to readiness and deployment rates. Short of this step, acquiring other combatants and support ships could lessen pressures on the Navy, while enhancing its responsiveness and ability to support national strategy.

The size of the future U.S. military likely will be debated in the coming years and its details analyzed endlessly, but the strategic bottom line already seems clear enough. The current force posture was sized in 1993 on the basis of strategic assumptions that are now in flux, headed toward an unknown destination that plausibly could call for equal or more forces, not less. If pressures for more forces continue growing, they likely will come not primarily from major new war-fighting requirements, but from the need to carry out the rising tempo of normal missions and operations around the world.

Today's U.S. forces are being stretched thin by the need to stay ready for major combat, while also carrying out missions for overseas presence, alliance commitments, strategic shaping, peacekeeping, and minor crisis interventions. Perhaps this trend can be dampened by setting strategic priorities more selectively, but the reality is that missions important to U.S. foreign policy and national security are hard to turn down. Today's missions and operations are being performed not for superfluous reasons, but because after careful review, they were deemed critical enough to justify their expenditure of scarce resources. The same will be true tomorrow, and the number of these missions may increase before it decreases. The current practice of providing enhanced funds for readiness can help reduce shortfalls, but not endlessly. If U.S. forces become stretched thin to the point of snapping, which some observers judge already is happening, the need for more assets will no longer be a debatable proposition. *A big force expansion likely will not be necessary. But a modest, well-planned expansion*

focused on critical assets might make a valuable contribution to future U.S. national security policy and military strategy.

To a degree, the future need for forces as large as today, or somewhat larger, could come into conflict with DoD budgetary pressures as the next procurement wave accelerates. If the situation is not handled well, plausibly decisions to emphasize fast procurement could compel contractions if the DoD budget is not large enough to fund both adequate forces and modernization. Alternatively, insufficient procurement of new weapons could compel contractions if old weapons can no longer be operated. Only time will tell. Much depends upon future defense budgets and procurement plans--neither of which are frozen in concrete. The Department of Defense has faced similar problems before, and similar to then, it will have options at its disposal for ensuring that sufficient forces remain in the posture even as an adequate procurement effort is carried out. If unwise contractions become necessary, the result could be a paring back of U.S. defense strategy and overseas involvements. But this step could damage U.S. security interests abroad and contribute to mounting dangers if power vacuums emerge in key areas. History suggests that the wisest course is to fund adequate defense budgets and to manage them carefully so that in size, readiness and modernization, U.S. forces are capable of meeting future requirements in solid, well-balanced ways. If necessary, the booming U.S. economy, and the budget surpluses flowing from it, are making somewhat larger defense budgets a viable option in ways that could dispel any lingering fears of a strategy-force mismatch.

The judgment that future U.S. force requirements likely will remain similar to now applies for the coming decade and somewhat beyond. Over the longer haul, much will depend upon how international conditions evolve and how they affect requirements. If the level of danger and threat remains similar to today, the required U.S. military posture likely will remain in the vicinity of today's force levels. The main task will be adjusting the existing posture in order to handle the ups and downs of ongoing changes abroad. If the international situation improves in major ways, force requirements likely will diminish and a smaller posture will suffice. If the global situation deteriorates markedly, a significant force expansion could be needed in order to meet growing requirements. The distant future is too uncertain to call. What can be said is that a modestly strengthened version of today's posture provides the assets to deal with the global situation at hand, while preserving the flexibility later to contract or expand as the future warrants.

Setting Priorities for Higher-Quality Forces.

Regardless of decisions made about quantity, U.S. forces will be kept strong and improved through efforts to enhance their quality. Judged in relation to their demanding global missions, U.S. forces are not impressively large. Although they are called upon to help keep several turbulent regions stable, they total only 7% of military manpower around the world. Even when U.S. forces concentrate to fight wars, their opponents typically are as large or larger than them. High quality is what allows U.S. forces to shape events in peacetime and to win wars. Today, they are the world’s best by a wide margin. The challenge is to keep that status. Because adversary forces will be improving by acquiring modern weapons, information systems, and asymmetric strategies, U.S. forces need to continue improving as well.

The current high quality of U.S. forces owes partly to their large amounts of training. To be sure, problems recently have arisen in personnel readiness because of high deployment rates that have taken some people and units away from their home bases for too long and too-often. Likewise, shortfalls have

appeared in some areas of materiel readiness -- e.g., depot maintenance and spares--that are now being corrected. Lost in the clamor has been awareness that for active military servicemen, per capita spending on operations and maintenance today is 40% higher than in 1990 (in constant dollars): a year when overall readiness was judged excellent. The result is that U.S. combat forces train at high rates in ways that build impressive combat power. For example, U.S. tactical air combat pilots fly about 220 hours per year, mostly in training. This level is four times higher than most foreign air forces, especially those of potential adversaries. Navy ship steaming days for training meet DoD's goals. Army tank miles per year are about 85% of DoD's goals, but this level is far higher than most foreign armies. Indeed, many foreign armies train only at the company level, but the U.S. Army trains at the battalion level: a huge difference in combat power. U.S. forces also engage in joint training: perhaps not enough, but far more than other countries, and they pursue training and exercises with key allies.

Another contributor is the high quality of U.S. weapons. Although DoD has been on an extended procurement holiday for some years, the weapons acquired in the 1980's are mostly still the world's best. This judgment clearly applies to U.S. fighter aircraft: the F-I5, F-16, F-14, and F-18. It also applies to the Army's M- I tank, Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle, and attack helicopters. As for maritime forces, no other Navy in the world has the big carriers, Aegis cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and submarines to launch major blue water operations, much less contest the U.S. Navy for control of the seas. Overall, good people, advanced training, excellent weapons, joint operations, modern doctrine, good power projection assets, and other factors combine together--in cumulative ways--to make U.S. forces far better than any others in quality. Some units doubtless are being called upon to do too many things: improvements are needed here. But overall, the idea that U.S. forces are steadily losing their fighting power in some wholesale way is bogus.

The primary vehicles for improving U.S. forces are the “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA) and their new joint doctrine, recently JV2010 and JV2020. The RMA aspires to blend modern information networks with new weapons, munitions, and structures to create ultra-sophisticated forces that can operate with greater speed, lethality, and punch than now. JV2010/JV2020 creates new doctrinal precepts for employing these RMA-enhanced ground, air, and naval forces in highly potent ways aimed at overpowering enemy forces quickly and decisively. Owing to the RMA and JV2010/JV2020, future U.S. forces will be able to disperse widely but operate together through networking. They are to be capable of maneuvering expertly, engaging precisely from the air and ground, striking at long ranges, drawing on leaner logistic support, and protecting themselves from attack. All services are now designing new structures and practices that will allow them to work together in jointly carrying out this doctrine. A good example is the Air Force’s creation of “Aerospace Expeditionary Forces”, the Army’s efforts to create fast-deployable brigades, and the Navy’s emphasis on networking of dispersed assets. Meanwhile, the Department of Defense is now gearing up for a major procurement effort intended to buy the new information systems, C4ISR technologies, tactical combat aircraft, new land and sea platforms, smart munitions, theater missile defenses, and other assets that will be needed. Hopefully steady progress will be made in the coming years, and by 2010-2020 this overall effort is intended to culminate in greatly enhanced forces that take modern warfare to a new dimension and a higher plain.

The speed and success of this effort will depend importantly upon future defense budgets and how they are spent. The budgets of recent years--hovering at about $250 billion--were too small to permit a major improvement effort. Compounding the problem was the need to spend heavily on readiness, which combined with other dynamics to push DoD’s spending for Operations and Maintenance (O&M) to $104 billion: 40% of the budget, an all-time high

compared to the normal level of about 30%. As a byproduct, procurement fell to only about $45 billion: barely enough to buy normal replacement stocks, and not nearly enough to acquire new weapons. To help correct this problem, the defense budget has been increased by $112 billion for 2000-2005. The FY2000 budget is $280 billion, it will rise to $320 billion by 2005, and likely rise to a higher level later in order to offset inflation and perhaps provide modest real growth. Procurement spending is also rising: to $54 billion in 2000, $75 billion in 2005, and likely more later. This infusion of funds will permit the Department of Defense greatly to accelerate its acquisition of the new weapons, munitions, and other systems needed to bring the RMA and JV2010/JV2020 to life. In particular, U.S. air forces will improve through acquisition of the F-22, JSF, F/A-18 E/F, Comanche helicopter and V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft.

Even so, the Pentagon likely will not be able to spend its way out of the age-old dilemma of setting priorities. About 95% of the funds likely to be available have already been committed. Future budgets, even larger than those now planned, likely will not be big enough to fund all plausible improvements. Pressures for new spending will be arising from multiple quarters: theater and national ballistic missile defenses, overseas operations and infrastructure, conventional force expansion, new force structures, personnel, readiness, and modernization. The Department of Defense will need to make hard decisions on what assets to acquire, and what assets to forsake. Its actions will have a major bearing on how the future unfolds. The challenge will be to set priorities wisely, so that the programs funded will produce the kind of improved forces most urgently needed by national strategy.

Setting priorities can begin by trimming secondary spending in the current budget and making better use of existing resources. Consolidating bases and infrastructure through BRAC is one example already being pursued. Another is DoD's pursuit of the "revolution in business affairs". Possibly low-priority O&M spending can be pruned so that more funds can be spent on high-priority readiness measures. Consolidation of tri-service assets in such areas as medical care, C4ISR, and administrative support can help—perhaps significantly so. As the RMA results in streamlined combat and support formations, the freed manpower can be used to add new assets, such as LDHD units. Finally, priorities will have to be set in determining how many funds to allocate among the multiple claimants for enhanced capabilities. The coming procurement wave offers an opportunity greatly to enhance U.S. air power. But fully finding it at a fast pace will be expensive, and there will be ample opportunities to spend scarce funds on other improvements, especially in building stronger force structures. *Most likely, a balanced approach will be best, but the point is that tough decisions about priorities should be subjected to careful analysis and planning.*

Using Forces Effectively

The Department of Defense also will face a second, equally important challenge: wisely organizing and employing its improved, high-technology forces so that they can effectively carry out the new missions of the future. History shows that gleaming forces are of little use unless they can act as potent instruments of strategy and fully perform the operations needed to achieve success. For example, the United States enjoyed a huge technology advantage in Vietnam, and still lost because its strategy was faulty and the outgunned enemy fought skillfully. Superb quality will matter in the future, but only if it is translated into winning performance and successful achievement of goals in peace, crisis, and war.

During peacetime, the act of wisely using U.S. forces will be heavily one of carrying out strategic shaping missions as effectively as possible. In each major theater, the United States

will be employing a spectrum of defense assets on behalf of multiple objectives in a fluid setting. These multiple assets will include headquarters units, stationed combat and support forces, temporary deployments, committed reinforcements from CONUS, prepositioned equipment, stocks, bases and facilities, and various types of security assistance. Together, these assets constitute an overall overseas presence program that must be integrated together, and blended with the other instruments of U.S. diplomacy and foreign policy. The successful performance of these assets, and their cost-effectiveness, is not something to be taken for granted. Instead the relationship between means and ends must be continuously studied and re-evaluated in order to ensure that program resources are sufficient, adequately balanced and prioritized, and effectively applied in ways aimed at bringing about the desired political and strategic results. Because international conditions will be continuously in flux, the defense management agenda in this arena promises to be challenging and difficult in ways mandating constant attention, plus a willingness to change when necessary. The future in this arena likely will be dynamic, not static: the United States will need to react accordingly. In recent years, the Department of Defense has created the TEP System (Theater Engagement Plans) to help determine goals and priorities through overseas presence. Continued use of this methodology, and further improvements to it, will be an ongoing need.

In the coming years, the United States likely will face the need to reassess the strategic rationale for its current pattern of troop deployments overseas. In general, sizable overseas deployments offer important strategic advantages in maintaining U.S. influence at high levels, training with allies and partners, and being ready to deal with quick-breaking emergencies. Yet, there are countervailing considerations: the current overseas presence of about 235,000 troops costs about $10-15 billion annually, and DoD's capacity swiftly to deploy forces from the United States means that rapid reinforcement now works effectively in many cases. Given this, large U.S. forces should remain deployed not for continuity's sake, but because they serve clear strategic purposes, are performing critical missions, and are a cost-effective way to spend scarce funds. The current distribution of forces has worked well during the past decade, but should not be seen as sacrosanct if a different, more appropriate presence becomes desirable. The continuing need for 100,000 troops in Europe likely will hinge not on NATO needs for border defense, but instead on whether the Europeans create improved forces for new missions that can act as partners with U.S. forces. In Asia, the need for 100,000 troops will depend heavily upon the situation on the Korean peninsula. If tensions ameliorate and Korea ultimately unifies, the United States may have reasons to seek a smaller Asian posture, one configured for mobile operations and region-wide missions. In Southwest Asia, growing dangers could increase the need for U.S. troop deployments, but political considerations currently bar this step.

Regardless of decisions on future force deployments, the Department of Defense will be best-advised to re-think how overseas presence and power projection are blended together in performing new-era missions in dangerous places. Current overseas bases in Europe and Japan will need to be re-configured as regional hubs for power projection, rather than merely acting as reception facilities for reinforcements that operate locally. To the extent possible, steps can be taken to acquire new bases, facilities, storage, and equipment prepositioning in distant areas where U.S. forces may be operating. Designing light but still-strong Army units that can deploy rapidly is important. Added prepositioning can help the Army make its heavy forces deploy faster. Airlift and sealift forces, critical to moving combat units swiftly, may need strengthening. Practical steps like these, which often escape public

attention, will have a major impact in determining whether future U.S. forces can serve as fully potent instruments of national strategy, or instead are left gleaming but not succeeding. *Such measures should be given careful attention in DoD budgets, for they easily can be lost in the clamor over bigger things.*

In recent years, U.S. military forces have been used to conduct peacekeeping missions, but their capacity to fight and win wars will remain their bellwether. Future crises and wars could come in many sizes and shapes, each requiring a tailored response that reflects force needs, military doctrine, and political goals. Flexibility is needed because small-to-medium crises and wars, in particular, could produce events that depart widely from commonly expected scenarios. In some cases, joint operations will be necessary in ways that require balanced contributions from all services. In other cases, one or another service component may predominate, but normally joint operations in some degree will be needed because each service brings uniquely valuable skills to warfighting. Simply stated, U.S. forces fight best as a joint team. Their capacity for jointness heavily accounts for their superiority on the modern battlefield. Stripped of their jointness, their other assets--sophisticated technology, modern doctrine, and advanced training--become less significant in carrying out demanding campaigns.

For major theater wars, well-endowed joint operations will remain the standard model: i.e., a robust combination of air, naval, and ground forces. For such wars, a realistic scenario is a threefold operation in which: 1.) Small but potent U.S. forces rush to the scene of battle in order to halt an enemy attack in the early days, before valuable terrain is lost; 2.) Larger U.S. forces are deployed over a period of weeks, during which enemy forces are degraded; 3.) Once their deployment is fully complete, U.S. forces launch a decisive counterattack aimed at destroying enemy forces, restoring lost territory, and attaining other political goals.

The task is to assemble a joint posture with the proper mix of assets to carry out operations in all three phases. Maritime forces provide an invaluable capacity for early availability, sea control, littoral operations from the sea, and forced entry. Clearly air forces and other deep strike assets will play major roles, especially during the initial halt and buildup phases, before large ground formations have had time fully to deploy. While USAF normally will deploy a large portion of these forces, the Navy and Marines provide fully one-third of total U.S. air power, and ship-launched cruise missiles provided added firepower. The Army contributes importantly to deep strike missions with its attack helicopters and MLRS/ATACMs. The act of blending these multiservice assets into a coordinated campaign, guided by a well-construed targeting strategy, is key to success.

The ongoing acquisition of JSTARS, other C41SR assets, information networks, and such smart munitions as Skeet and BAT is greatly increasing the capacity of these long-range strike assets to attack targets in near-real time, to destroy them with maximum effectiveness, and to inflict major attrition on enemy forces. In theory, they will possess the raw firepower and lethality to dominate many future wars, while suffering few casualties. The mechanical application of attrition mathematics, however, is often a poor guide to judging the complex dynamics of war. Relying exclusively on deep strike assets to defeat a well-armed and wily enemy seems unwise because their effectiveness can be degraded by rugged terrain, bad weather, enemy tactics, and the sheer frictions of war. In addition, deep strike assets cannot seize and hold ground, or liberate cities, or physically eject enemy forces that are entrenched to the point of withstanding bombardment from the air. For these reasons, sizable numbers of ground forces often will be needed in order to conduct blocking actions during the defensive phase and to conduct swift, decisive counterattacks in the aftermath.

The exact number of ground forces needed will vary with the occasion, but the key point is that numbers matter in determining how campaign plans are carried out. More forces broaden the tactical options available to commanders and thereby provide increased leverage over opponents. For example, a

force of two corps may possess more than double the combat power of only one corps--by a considerable margin. For example, two corps can allow a commander to conduct a dual “hammer and anvil” maneuver rather than a single-dimension operation: thus significantly enhancing prospects for defeating a tough enemy. In designing deployments and campaign plans, the proper approach normally will be to determine the missions that must be performed in order to win decisively, and to tailor force commitments accordingly. This standard applies not only in determining total force levels, but also in selecting the mix of ground forces: the combination of armor, mechanized, light infantry, airborne, air assault, amphibious, and artillery used on each occasion.

The combat operations of U.S. ground forces are themselves undergoing major changes in response to new doctrines, technologies, structures, and practices. Their firepower and lethality are growing, frontages are widening, speed of tactical mobility is increasing, combat units are expected to strike deeper than in the past, and logistic support is improving while being streamlined. As a result, U.S. ground forces seem likely to preserve and upgrade their capacity to perform demanding missions in ways that keep their casualties low. In the final analysis, nonetheless, it is the joint nature of U.S. force operations that greatly elevates their combat power owing to the synergy, leverage, and fast tempo provided by all services working together on behalf of common campaign plans. Equally important, U.S. combat operations are being guided by a new military mentality aimed at capitalizing on the changing nature of modern warfare. Success at this endeavor promises to help keep U.S. forces superior to future opponents. But if these gains are to be achieved, the necessary changes will have to be carried out, and future U.S. joint operations will need to be planned carefully in ways that reflect the mix of forces needed in each case.

Also, U.S. defense plans will need a clear understanding of force needs for carrying out specific new missions and operations in future crises and wars. In recent years, a prevailing assumption has been that U.S. military interventions will be either relatively small or quite big: e.g., 10,000 troops for peacekeeping or, alternatively, 400,000 troops for a big MTW conflict. In some situations, one or the other of these polar-opposite models will still apply. But in other situations, a quite different model may be needed: a swift and decisive medium-sized deployment of 75,000-150,000 troops. For example, the Kosovo conflict required about this number in directly committed air and naval units. *A sensible step would be to develop medium-sized joint strike packages for each of the three major commands: EUCOM, CENTCOM, and PACOM.* A joint package composed of the following units would provide a broad array of operational capabilities, including the capacity to conduct counter-proliferation strikes against WMD-armed opponents:

- A CVBG, including a carrier, its air wing, and surface combatants armed with cruise missiles.
- An ARG, with a Marine battalion and associated combat aircraft, backed by the capacity to build to 1-2 brigades.
- For USAF, 2-3 Aerospace Expeditionary Forces (AEF), with a mix of interceptors, fighter bombers, bombers, reconnaissance, and other aircraft.
- For the Army, 1-2 brigades capable of building to 1-2 divisions in a few weeks.
- Advanced C4ISR systems, information technologies, and smart munitions.

Efforts to tailor appropriate force packages for crises and wars should be accompanied by careful thought about how U.S. force operations are to be integrated into the politics and diplomacy of

each situation. Although the new U.S. military doctrines and forces will provide enhanced capabilities to inflict decisive battlefield defeat on opponents, the issues and stakes in many conflicts may be heavily political, rather than primarily military. Often the ability to win on the battlefield will not necessarily guarantee successful achievement of political goals. These goals often will be attainable only if military campaigns are tailored to support them and U.S. forces are employed accordingly. Especially because many crises and wars likely will grow out of murky politics, achieving such political-military integration of force operations may be one of the most important challenges confronting U.S. strategy in the coming years.

. *An equally weighty challenge will be learning how best to employ U.S. forces in WMD settings.* During peacetime, a principal challenge will be reassuring a number of friends and allies who may be seeking U.S. nuclear deterrence coverage of the sort extended to NATO and Japan. Extended deterrence worked in those places, but the numerous conditions for its recreation may not be present along much of the southern belt and elsewhere. If this is the case, a different approach will have to be found, one that adequately protects these countries and U.S. interests. Crafting it promises to be a demanding exercise in new strategic logic. The Cooperative Defense Initiative now being pursued in the Greater Middle East is an example of the new approaches likely to be needed. Another example is the U.S. effort to promote multilateral cooperation in Asia about how to respond to WMD threats.

During crises and wars, the challenge will be similarly difficult. Throughout the Cold War, U.S. forces faced an enemy with nuclear weapons in Central Europe, but since then, they have had the luxury of preparing for purely conventional conflicts. In contrast, future wars may see aggressors attacking with conventional forces, but holding WMD systems in reserve and potentially willing to use them. Many important physical steps are underway to prepare for this development. Acquiring theater ballistic missile defenses will help protect deploying U.S. troops and other local targets, and if a national missile defense system is built, the continental United States will be protected against limited attacks as well. Dispersing deployed U.S. forces can reduce their vulnerability. Acquisition of better strike assets, especially at long ranges in real time, will provide a capacity to degrade enemy WMD systems before they are used.

While all of these steps will help importantly, creating a sound political-military doctrine for force operations may be equally important. During the Cold War, the doctrine of forward defense and flexible response provided a path for initiating conventional operations, then crossing the nuclear threshold, and gradually escalating in a politically controlled manner. Whether the same doctrine can be applied to the coming era of different strategic affairs is to be seen. What seems certain is that an appropriate doctrine will have to be created and implemented in ways that leave U.S. forces prepared to carry it out, not only through conventional operations but also escalation when necessary.

Building Better Allied and Coalition Forces For New Missions

Plans to enhance the quality of U.S. forces need to be accompanied by policies aimed at encouraging allies and partners to become better at power-projection and new missions. Otherwise, U.S. forces will be left carrying too many burdens, and so overstretched that they cannot be effective in many places at once. For this reason, satisfactory progress in this arena may be fully as important as enhancing the quality of U.S. forces. Owing to the Cold War heritage of defending only their own borders, allied forces are weak at performing new power-projection missions. Whereas the United States can project about 750,000 troops from all services, the European allies could project only about 75,000 troops, and even then, slowly. Asian allies are even worse. As U.S. forces become more capable of swift power projection followed by RMA strike missions, the gap could grow so large that allied

forces will not be able to operate with them even if political leaders want them to do so. If today's gap grows into a huge gulf, it could put a practical end to western coalition defense planning. [xv]

Two years ago, there were few signs that NATO and the Europeans would respond effectively, but since then, matters have changed for the better in political terms. Initial signs of change were evident even before the Kosovo war erupted in early 1999. But when NATO initiated combat operations aimed at compelling Serbian troops to leave Kosovo, the experience turned out to be galvanizing. The conflict showed that wars could still occur in Europe, and that NATO could muster the coalition resolve to win them. Kosovo also highlighted the shortfalls in European forces. Even though only air and naval forces were used, and operations were launched within range of NATO bases, the Europeans contributed only about 30% of the forces: the rest were provided by the United States. European forces performed their missions effectively, but deficiencies in such areas as C3I, support aircraft, all-weather capability, and smart munitions became evident. When the Serbs withdrew in June, large U.S. and European ground forces entered Kosovo to perform enduring peacekeeping duties. In the aftermath, European leaders began voicing heightened awareness of the need to improve their forces, and American leaders publicly urged them to act.

At its spring, 1999, summit in Washington, NATO adopted a new strategic concept. While this concept reaffirmed that NATO will remain a collective defense alliance for defending common borders, it also called upon the alliance to prepare forces for new missions--from peacekeeping to war-fighting--outside its territory in the Euro-Atlantic area or beyond. At this summit, NATO also adopted its new "Defense Capabilities Initiative" (DCI), which encourages the Europeans to focus on swift power projection and decisive strike operations for new missions. This multiyear plan, now underway, calls for major improvements in such critical areas as RMA weapons, C4I systems, multinational logistics, and strategic mobility assets. With the DCI underway, a few months later the Europeans announced parallel changes to their unification-oriented security and defense plans under the "European Security and Defense Policy" (ESDP). Their Helsinki accord broadened the ESDP beyond purely political steps to include efforts to build the types of improved military capabilities called for by the DCI.

These multilateral gestures have been accompanied by forward-looking steps by individual European countries. The U.K. defense review called for further measures aimed at improving British forces for power projection and modern strike operations. The French defense review did the same. Although these two countries always have been Europe's best at power projection, the Germans have begun showing signs of life by earmarking similar forces for new missions. In smaller ways, other countries, including Italy and the Netherlands, are doing likewise. Critics have derided these gestures as hollow because insufficient funds allegedly are being made available for fast progress. But at least the Europeans are now talking in responsive political language: in the past, normally a sign of action to come.

The key issue now is whether the Europeans will act in sufficiently strong ways. The task facing them is far from herculean. They already possess the basic assets needed to perform new missions if modest improvements are made. They have fully 2.3 million active troops under arms, and a force posture of about 53 mobilizable divisions, 3350 combat aircraft, and 345 major naval combatants. This large posture--almost 50% larger than U.S. forces--arguably provides more formations than are needed to perform NATO's missions, old and new. The chief constraint is lack of funds for new measures, but this problem seems solvable. Reducing current forces somewhat could free funds for investment: today,

Europe's defense spending of $160 billion annually is mostly so consumed by personnel and operations that procurement efforts are too meager. If prudent priorities are set, the overall, ten-year cost of the DCI likely will be about $100-125 billion. This amount is only about 6-7% of Europe's planned defense spending for the coming decade. A combination of savings in current budgets plus modest increases--e.g., 1-2% annually in real terms--could generate the flexible funds needed by the DCI and other improvement priorities.

The high-priority need is to improve European contributions to NATO Rapid Reaction Forces (or similar formations) for new projection and strike missions. These forces number eight divisions, 600 combat aircraft, and 150 naval combatants. Currently, only about one-fourth of them can swiftly deploy outside NATO's borders--a deficiency that was manifested in the Persian Gulf War and Kosovo. The biggest deficiency is lack of adequate strategic transport and logistic support assets for long-distance combat missions in austere settings. Fortunately this deficiency can be remedied inexpensively: through use of commercial aircraft and cargo ships, and by acquiring limited amounts of special logistics equipment. The European forces already possess modern weapons and other platforms. If they are given improved C4ISR assets, information systems and networks, smart munitions, and updated doctrines, they will be able to operate alongside RMA-capable U.S. forces in complementary ways. With better mobility and logistic support, they also will be able to deploy more rapidly then now, and to operate decisively with U.S. forces in the aftermath. In this way, NATO can preserve its capacity to perform combined U.S.-allied operations, not only inside Europe, but outside as well.

Prospects in other regions are less bright, but modest steps can be taken as the political traffic permits. In Asia, Japan has agreed to new defense guidelines that enhance its forces for some new missions outside its borders, and other countries are expressing interest in collective military endeavors. In the Persian Gulf, U.S. partners have only small forces, but efforts to bring them closer together can enhance the region's self-defense prospects. Across the Greater Middle East, other countries, normally with bigger forces, can be brought together in a flexible web of coalition partnerships. Much will depend upon the Arab-Israeli peace process, but if major progress is made, the door may be opened to closer U.S. collaboration with a variety of countries. In both regions, coalitions of the capable and willing, rather than formal multilateral alliances, likely will provide the main mechanisms for combined operations.

In all key regions, progress in this arena will be critical for both military and political reasons. Emerging security and defense requirements are too big to be handled by U.S. forces alone: greater contributions by allies and partners are a military necessity. Politically, enhanced contributions are needed to maintain the bonds that tie the United States to its European and Asian alliances. Otherwise, allies still will be defending their secure borders, while the United States is left struggling to defend common interests elsewhere, where the threats and dangers are serious. Such a strategic imbalance will be unsustainable on both sides of the Atlantic and Pacific.

What the future will require is agreement on new transatlantic defense and security bargain, and one for the Pacific as well. Such a bargain will need to provide a common agenda for protecting mutual security interests, sharing burdens fairly, and ensuring that defense requirements are met through appropriate but flexible commitments of U.S. and allied forces. A strategic bargain of this sort sustained both alliances through the dark years of the Cold War and helped them emerge victorious. A similar but new bargain is needed again. If crafted, it will help enable the United States and its democratic partners perform the new and demanding missions of the future, in ways allowing them to cope better with the problems and opportunities of a globalizing world.

Conclusion

This chapter has advanced several specific ideas for how U.S. defense planning in the coming era can be improved. These ideas will need to be evaluated on their merits. The underlying point is more important. Today the United States enjoys a favorable strategic situation around the world heavily because, in the past, it created a strong defense posture and proved adept at using it effectively in peace, crisis, and war. With globalization now taking place and the international scene evolving in other ways, the same strategic effectiveness will be needed tomorrow. What marks today's scene as radically different from the Cold War is the scope and pace of change taking place, propelling events toward an uncertain destination. The central strategic challenge facing the United States is to influence how the future unfolds so that the ultimate destination proves healthy. Because the world is changing, U.S. foreign policy and national security strategy will need to change so that this demanding strategic mission can be accomplished. In more ways than one, the same judgment applies to U.S. defense planning. The United States will need to maintain strong, high-quality military forces. It will need to apply them wisely around the globe, in places dictated by U.S. interests and unfolding events. If the United States can perform both tasks, it will greatly enhance its capacity to deal with the international challenges ahead--regardless of how they unfold.

Endnotes

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[xi] For more detail see Richard L. Kugler, "Global Military Balance: Stable or Unstable?", in INSS/NDU's Strategic Assessment 1999: Priorities, for a Turbulent World (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1999).

[xii] For more analysis of U.S. interests, see Joseph Nye, "Redefining the National Interest", Foreign Affairs (July/August, 1999).

[xiii] See Robert Gilpin, The Challenge of Global Capitalism: -- The World Economy in the 21st Century (Chapter 11) 329-357.

[xiv] For details on U.S. force levels and defense budget, see Secretary of Defense William Cohen, Annual Report to the President and Congress (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, GPD, 2000).

[xv] For more detail, see David Gompert, Richard Kugler, and Martin Libicki: Mind the Gap: Promoting a Transatlantic Revolution in Military Affairs (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 1999).